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ABSTRACT—The Supreme Court has recently insisted that plaintiffs must 
have standing for every claim that they raise. But this claim-specific 
approach to standing is at odds with established practice in several 
contexts, including rulings on the severability of statutes. Courts often 
permit plaintiffs to claim that statutory provisions should be invalidated 
pursuant to severability doctrine, without requiring that they have standing 
for those claims. This Article argues that existing practice for severability 
is a form of “supplemental standing.” Supplemental standing is analogous 
to supplemental jurisdiction. It allows a plaintiff with standing for one 
claim to raise related claims, even if the plaintiff lacks standing for those 
other claims. Although the Supreme Court has purported to reject this 
concept, current law effectively grants supplemental standing for 
severability claims—and with good reason. When a court rules that part of 
a statute is unconstitutional, a ruling on severability is necessary to give 
effect to Congress’s intent regarding the remainder of the statute. 
Supplemental standing permits those rulings, but claim-specific standing 
would often prevent them. In the severability context, therefore, 
supplemental standing is more faithful to the central purpose of standing 
doctrine: preserving the separation of powers. This Article contends that 
current practice also implicitly grants supplemental standing in additional 
contexts, including facial challenges to statutes and cases involving 
multiple plaintiffs. These examples suggest that, while the claim-specific 
approach to standing is a useful default rule, the Court has been wrong to 
insist on that approach as a categorical matter. The Article concludes by 
exploring additional circumstances in which shifting to a supplemental-
standing approach appears to be justified on separation of powers grounds. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has adopted a claim-specific 
approach to standing doctrine. Under that approach, plaintiffs must have 
standing for every claim that they raise.1 Suppose, for example, that a 
plaintiff argues that two provisions of a statute are unconstitutional. The 
Court has held that the plaintiff must satisfy the test for standing, including 
the injury in fact requirement, with respect to both provisions.2 
This claim-specific theory of standing can be contrasted with an 
alternative approach that this Article calls “supplemental standing.”3 
Supplemental standing would be analogous to supplemental jurisdiction, 
which permits a plaintiff who asserts a federal claim to assert related state 
law claims even if those state law claims do not independently fall within 
 
1 See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352–53 (2006). 
2 See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 733–34 (2008). 
3 See Cuno, 547 U.S. at 353 (describing this concept as “ancillary standing,” and rejecting it); cf. 
13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.16 (3d ed. 2008) 
(referring to a related but distinct question of whether a party can challenge a given transaction based on 
any substantive theory as a question of “supplemental standing”). 
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the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.4 A supplemental-
standing approach would similarly permit a plaintiff with standing for one 
claim to assert related claims, even if the plaintiff lacked standing for those 
other claims. For example, plaintiffs who have standing to challenge one 
provision of a statute could theoretically have supplemental standing to 
challenge other provisions of the statute that do not injure them. 
Supplemental standing would therefore expand the universe of claims that 
a federal court has the constitutional power to decide. 
In its recent decision in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, the Supreme 
Court rejected the concept of supplemental standing on two grounds.5 First, 
it asserted that the claim-specific theory of standing is dictated by 
established practice.6 The Court relied on previous decisions that required 
plaintiffs to establish standing for each claim that they raised, albeit 
without mentioning the possibility of supplemental standing.7 Second, it 
concluded that the claim-specific approach is required for functional 
reasons.8 Standing doctrine is meant to protect the separation of powers and 
promote sound decisionmaking by limiting courts to the resolution of 
concrete, adverse disputes.9 The Court reasoned that the claim-specific 
approach to standing is also necessary to preserve these interests.10 In other 
words, if standing requirements are not applied on a claim-specific basis, 
the Court concluded that they might as well not be applied at all. 
The academic literature on standing has largely overlooked the Court’s 
adoption of a claim-specific approach and its rejection of supplemental 
standing. Scholars have focused on the application of the doctrine to 
individual claims, rather than cases involving multiple claims.11 Of course, 
academic treatment of standing has not been sympathetic. Scholars have 
argued for decades that the doctrine—at least to the extent that it requires a 
showing of injury in fact—should be abandoned because it is illegitimate 
 
4 See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). 
5 See 547 U.S. at 351–52. 
6 See id. 
7 See id. 
8 See id. at 352–53. 
9 See, e.g., id. at 341–42; see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516–17 (2007). 
10 See Cuno, 547 U.S. at 352–53. 
11 For scholarly critiques of standing doctrine as applied to individual claims, see, for example, 
Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459 (2008); William A. Fletcher, The 
Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988); Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191 
(2014); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-
Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988). 
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and unprincipled.12 The Supreme Court has nevertheless remained 
committed to standing doctrine in the face of this scholarly criticism.13 
This Article suggests that supplemental standing offers a way forward. 
That is because adopting the concept of supplemental standing would help 
to alleviate the problems that scholars have identified with standing 
doctrine. Yet it should also appeal to supporters of existing standing 
principles, including a majority of the Supreme Court. 
Supplemental standing would help to address at least two substantial 
scholarly concerns with existing standing principles. First, scholars have 
observed that standing doctrine can undermine the rule of law.14 
Sometimes, when the government commits a legal violation, no plaintiff 
will have standing to challenge it. Under current standing principles, the 
courts can never remedy such a violation. The result is that the law goes 
unenforced.15 Supplemental standing could help to alleviate this problem by 
authorizing the federal courts to decide more claims, and thus to remedy 
some legal violations that might otherwise never be redressed. 
Second, scholars have pointed out that existing standing law is often 
undemocratic.16 Because it treats an injury in fact as a constitutional 
requirement, standing doctrine limits Congress’s power to create new 
private rights of action.17 Even when Congress concludes that it is 
important to allow private parties to bring suit to enforce federal law in the 
absence of standing, current doctrine forbids it. Supplemental standing, in 
contrast, would not require an injury in fact for every claim, and would 
therefore grant Congress more discretion to decide who should be able to 
bring suit in federal court. Thus, supplemental standing would help to 
ensure that standing requirements are subject to democratic control. For 
these reasons, while it cannot solve every problem with standing law, 
supplemental standing would almost certainly be preferable to the claim-
specific approach from the perspective of those who are skeptical of 
existing doctrine. 
The bulk of this Article, however, is dedicated to a more difficult 
question—whether even the supporters of existing standing doctrine should 
agree that supplemental standing is warranted in at least some 
circumstances. To address that question, this Article considers whether 
implementing standing doctrine on a claim-specific basis makes sense on 
 
12 See Elliott, supra note 11, at 466–67 (summarizing the criticisms of standing doctrine). 
13 See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1142–43 (2013) (holding that plaintiffs 
lacked standing to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge against government surveillance of electronic 
communications). 
14 See, e.g., Re, supra note 11, at 1205. 
15 See id. 
16 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 11, at 210–11. 
17 See, e.g., id. at 211, 219–20. 
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its own terms. That is, assuming that standing is a constitutional 
requirement, do the purported rationales for taking a claim-specific 
approach to standing hold up? Is it truly consistent with established 
practice, and does it serve the purposes that the Court says it does?18 If not, 
then even defenders of standing law should agree that there is a problem. 
On inspection, there is such a problem. This Article argues that the 
claim-specific approach to standing conflicts with established practice in a 
context that has become increasingly important in recent years: rulings on 
the severability of statutes. It also argues that requiring claim-specific 
standing for severability would contradict the central purposes of standing 
doctrine. The Court’s justifications for claim-specific standing therefore 
break down in the context of severability. 
To develop these points, a brief introduction to severability doctrine is 
helpful. When part of a statute is unconstitutional, severability principles 
determine what happens to the remainder of the statute.19 The Supreme 
Court’s current approach to severability focuses on Congress’s intent. It 
asks whether, if Congress had been aware of the constitutional problem 
with part of the statute, it would still have enacted the remainder of the 
statute.20 Severability doctrine therefore aims to preserve the separation of 
powers by leaving the constitutionally valid parts of a statute intact only if 
Congress would have wanted them to stand on their own.21 
Established practice on severability is at odds with the claim-specific 
theory of standing. Courts and scholars widely agree that a court always 
has the power to apply severability doctrine after it rules that part of a 
statute is unconstitutional.22 For reasons explained below, however, the 
 
18 Professor Elliott has argued that standing doctrine itself does not serve the purposes that the 
Court has assigned to it. See Elliott, supra note 11, at 467–68. The Court, however, has continued to 
assert that the doctrine advances the separation of powers and ensures good judicial decisions. See, e.g., 
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146–47; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516–17 (2007). To meet the 
Court on its own terms, therefore, this Article assumes that standing doctrine can achieve those 
objectives, and asks whether a claim-specific approach is better or worse at achieving them than a 
supplemental-standing approach. 
19 See, e.g., Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 743–44 (2010). 
20 See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330–31 (2006) (holding 
that the partially unconstitutional applications of a statute regulating abortion were potentially severable 
and remanding for consideration of legislative intent). 
21 See id. at 329–31. 
22 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607–08 (2012) (plurality 
opinion) (addressing severability without mentioning standing); id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in 
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (same); id. at 2671 (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that standing principles do not limit a court’s power to 
decide severability); Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303, 305 (2007) (“Upon 
finding a law unconstitutional, a court must do its best to implement the remaining will of the very 
legislature that enacted the invalid law . . . .”); Kevin C. Walsh, The Ghost that Slayed the Mandate, 
64 STAN. L. REV. 55, 76–77 (2012) (arguing that, if a court rules that the statutory provision that injures 
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claim-specific approach would prevent a court from applying severability 
doctrine if the plaintiff lacked standing to raise it.23 As a result, existing 
practice on severability is best understood as a form of supplemental 
standing. When a court rules that part of a statute is unconstitutional, 
current law implicitly grants the plaintiff supplemental standing to raise a 
claim about severability. 
Consider, for example, National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius (NFIB),24 in which the Court nearly struck down the entire 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) on inseverability 
grounds. There was no doubt in NFIB that the plaintiff States had standing 
to argue that the ACA’s expansion of the Medicaid program was 
unconstitutional.25 Under the claim-specific approach, however, the States 
did not appear to have standing to challenge the many other provisions of 
the ACA, such as the requirement that individuals purchase health 
insurance, or the requirement that insurance coverage be provided without 
regard for preexisting health conditions.26 The Court nonetheless effectively 
granted the States supplemental standing to challenge those other 
provisions by considering their argument that the Medicaid expansion 
could not be severed, and that the entire statute should therefore be struck 
down.27 The States did not succeed on that argument, but that is because the 
Court rejected it on the merits, not for lack of standing. 
Although it would be possible to depart from current practice and 
apply the claim-specific theory to severability questions, supplemental 
standing for severability is more faithful to the interests that standing law is 
meant to serve—separation of powers and sound decisionmaking. When a 
court rules that part of a statute is unconstitutional, a ruling on severability 
protects the separation of powers by ensuring that the court does not leave 
in place a revised version of the statute that Congress never would have 
 
the plaintiff is unconstitutional, then the court can decide whether that provision is severable from other 
provisions that do not injure the plaintiff). 
23 Although at least one commentator has recently recognized this inconsistency between 
severability doctrine and the claim-specific approach to standing, he took the claim-specific standing 
theory as a given, and did not address the possibility of supplemental standing. See Eric S. Fish, 
Severability as Conditionality, EMORY L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 48–51) (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2395650 [http://perma.cc/N67V-JF6B]) (assuming that standing should be 
claim-specific in the severability context).  
24 132 S. Ct. 2566. 
25 See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1244 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that “the state plaintiffs undeniably ha[d] standing to challenge the Medicaid provisions”). 
26 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585 (plurality opinion) (describing these provisions of the ACA); cf. 
Florida, 648 F.3d at 1243 (declining to decide whether the States had standing to challenge the 
requirement that individuals purchase health insurance). 
27 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607–08 (plurality opinion); id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
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enacted. Supplemental standing permits the court to make such a ruling on 
severability, but the claim-specific approach often would not. As a result, 
even the defenders of narrow standing principles on the Supreme Court 
have recognized that limiting a court’s authority to make severability 
decisions would interfere with the separation of powers.28 Using standing 
law to limit severability rulings also would do little to promote accurate 
decisions. Because severability is a purely legal question of Congress’s 
intent, judicial accuracy on severability is particularly unlikely to be 
enhanced by the injury in fact requirement.29 
The claim-specific approach would also undermine the purposes of 
standing doctrine in the severability context for additional reasons. As 
explained below, even though it would limit a court’s power to make 
severability rulings, the claim-specific approach would not limit the court’s 
power to make highly abstract constitutional rulings. That is because the 
claim-specific approach would still permit plaintiffs to argue that, even if 
the part of the statute that applies to them is constitutional, that part of the 
statute is invalid because some other part of the statute is both 
unconstitutional and inseverable. This type of claim is analogous to a First 
Amendment overbreadth claim, under which plaintiffs have standing to 
argue that a statute is wholly invalid because its application to other parties 
is unconstitutional.30 
The claim-specific approach would therefore produce a 
counterintuitive asymmetry: It would limit plaintiffs’ ability to make 
severability arguments about parts of a statute that do not apply to them, 
but not their ability to make constitutional arguments about parts of a 
statute that do not apply to them. From the perspective of separation of 
powers, that would get things backwards—particularly because Congress 
can overturn a court’s severability rulings, but not its constitutional 
rulings.31 As a result, applying the claim-specific theory of standing to 
severability would not only depart from existing practice, but also have 
deeply troubling consequences. 
 
28 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2671 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting); see also 
Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn when Conservative Plaintiffs Lose Under 
Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551, 551 (2012) (recognizing that “conservative members of 
the Court usually support restrictive standing doctrine”). 
29 Cf. Elliott, supra note 11, at 474 (arguing that the injury in fact requirement does little to ensure 
good judicial decisionmaking even as a general matter). 
30 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (describing overbreadth doctrine); 
Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. 
U. L. REV. 359, 368–70 (1998) (recognizing that overbreadth claims and inseverability claims are 
analogous). 
31 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265 (2005) (observing that “[t]he ball now lies 
in [Congress’s] court” after ruling on the severability of federal sentencing provisions, and noting that 
Congress could overturn the Court’s severability ruling). 
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If severability were the only context in which the claim-specific theory 
encountered these problems, the Court’s categorical embrace of that theory 
might still be defensible as a matter of uniformity and simplicity. But at 
least two other well-known doctrines conflict with claim-specific standing, 
and instead follow a supplemental-standing approach. First, when courts 
strike down statutes pursuant to facial challenges, they rule on whether the 
statute can be applied not just to the plaintiff, but to anyone.32 In effect, 
therefore, courts grant plaintiffs raising facial challenges supplemental 
standing to assert the claims of other potential plaintiffs. Second, it has 
long been agreed that, if one plaintiff has standing for a claim, a court need 
not decide whether other plaintiffs in the same case also have standing for 
that claim.33 This rule operates as a form of supplemental standing because 
it permits plaintiffs who lack standing for their own claims to obtain relief 
when another plaintiff has standing.34 Like severability, the established 
practices for facial challenges and cases with multiple plaintiffs are also 
faithful to the purposes of standing doctrine.35 
These examples confirm that the Court has been incorrect in 
purporting to adopt the claim-specific theory of standing as a categorical 
matter. Although that theory provides a useful default rule, it is subject to 
well-established and well-justified exceptions. And those exceptions are 
best explained by the concept of supplemental standing. Because 
supplemental standing already applies in practice and is justified in 
principle, standing doctrine should be revised to account for it. Although 
this Article does not attempt to develop a comprehensive theory of 
supplemental standing, it sketches some potential contours of such a 
theory, and explores additional categories of cases in which shifting to a 
supplemental-standing approach may be warranted. 
 
32 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Commentary, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-
Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1326 (2000) (explaining that a favorable ruling on a facial 
challenge results in the “total unenforceability” of the statute).  
33 See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263–64 & n.9 
(1977). 
34 See, e.g., Joan Steinman, The Effects of Case Consolidation on the Procedural Rights of 
Litigants: What They Are, What They Might Be—Part 1: Justiciability and Jurisdiction (Original and 
Appellate), 42 UCLA L. REV. 717, 741–48 (1995) (relying on principles drawn from supplemental 
jurisdiction to argue that this practice is consistent with Article III). 
35 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 
964 (2011) (explaining that facial challenges are consistent with the separation of powers because “[i]t 
is the Court’s function sometimes to resolve uncertainty and to ensure effective constitutional 
implementation by laying down broad, clear rules or tests that may have the effect of establishing . . . 
that a particular statute is unconstitutional in all applications”); Steinman, supra note 34, at 729 
(observing that the rule for multiple plaintiffs “comports with a number of the basic values that are 
served by standing doctrine,” including the separation of powers, because “so long as some plaintiff has 
standing, the courts can be assured that, by hearing the case, they are fulfilling the role of the federal 
judiciary in our governmental system, but not exceeding their proper sphere”). 
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Part I of this Article provides background on standing and severability 
doctrines, and describes established practice on the interaction between 
standing and severability principles. Part II introduces the concepts of 
claim-specific standing and supplemental standing, and considers why the 
Court has recently insisted on the claim-specific approach. Part III argues 
that the claim-specific standing theory is inconsistent with existing practice 
on severability, and that applying the claim-specific theory to severability 
would contradict the purposes of standing doctrine. Part IV contends that 
the Court’s established approach to severability should be understood as a 
form of supplemental standing. It also suggests that supplemental standing 
explains accepted practice in other contexts. This Part concludes by 
considering how the concept of supplemental standing could be 
incorporated into standing doctrine as a more general matter. 
I. ESTABLISHED PRACTICE FOR STANDING AND SEVERABILITY 
A. Standing 
The basic contours of standing doctrine are well established, albeit 
highly controversial.36 The Supreme Court has held that, at its core, 
standing is a constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal 
courts.37 Article III grants power to the federal courts only over “Cases” 
and “Controversies,”38 and the Court’s view is that a dispute is an Article 
III “Case” or “Controversy” only if the plaintiff has standing.39 The Court 
has further held that a plaintiff has standing for constitutional purposes only 
if (1) the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact, (2) the injury was caused 
by the defendant, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable 
ruling.40 Because the Court views these requirements as constitutional in 
character, Congress cannot eliminate them.41 
The Court has identified two central purposes for standing doctrine.42 
First, standing principles are meant to preserve the constitutional separation 
of powers.43 The injury in fact requirement narrows the circumstances in 
which the federal courts can exercise judicial review, and therefore 
restrains the authority of the courts vis-à-vis the other branches of the 
 
36 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 11, at 466–67 (describing the “extensive controversy” that surrounds 
standing law and collecting scholarly sources that criticize the doctrine).  
37 See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341–42 (2006). 
38 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  
39 Cuno, 547 U.S. at 342. 
40 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
41 See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997). 
42 See Re, supra note 11, at 1194. 
43 See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146–47 (2013); Cuno, 547 U.S. at 
341–42. 
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federal government.44 Second, standing doctrine is supposed to promote 
sound judicial decisions.45 The theory is that courts are best at deciding the 
types of concrete disputes that have traditionally been viewed as “cases” or 
“controversies.”46 Courts also rely heavily on the presentations of the 
parties in the adversary system, and the injury in fact and causation 
requirements help to ensure that the parties have a sufficient stake in a 
dispute to frame the issues properly for the court.47 
Even when the constitutional test for standing is satisfied, courts can 
rely on additional, prudential considerations to limit the exercise of their 
jurisdiction.48 These prudential standing principles include a general 
prohibition on third-party standing, meaning that a plaintiff “generally must 
assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief 
on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”49 The Supreme Court has 
stated that these prudential limitations also protect the separation of powers 
and promote sound decisionmaking.50 
Because prudential standing limitations are not imposed by the 
Constitution, they are subject to exceptions.51 The general rule against 
third-party standing, in particular, is not absolute. The Court has held that a 
plaintiff can raise the rights of a third party when the plaintiff and the third 
party have some relationship, and when it would be difficult for the third 
party to assert his or her own rights.52 For example, when the prosecution 
strikes prospective jurors based on their race, criminal defendants can raise 
 
44 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146–47. 
45 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007). 
46 See id. at 516 (observing that the case-or-controversy requirement limits “the business of federal 
courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of 
resolution through the judicial process” (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968))); Valley Forge 
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) 
(explaining that the injury in fact requirement “tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the 
court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual 
context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action”). 
47 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517 (“At bottom, ‘the gist of the question of standing’ is whether 
petitioners have ‘such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete 
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for 
illumination.’” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962))). 
48 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685–86 (2013). 
49 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
50 See id. at 498 (explaining that, in both its constitutional and prudential dimensions, standing 
doctrine “is founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a 
democratic society”); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687 (observing that prudential standing 
limitations also help to sharpen the issues and ensure that disputes are concrete and adverse). 
51 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687 (explaining that “the relevant prudential factors that counsel 
against hearing [a] case [can be] subject to ‘countervailing considerations’” (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 
500–01)). 
52 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991) (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113–16 
(1976)). 
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an equal protection challenge that rests on the third-party rights of the 
prospective jurors.53 Prudential standing limitations are also subject to 
control by Congress, which can add to them, subtract from them, or 
eliminate them altogether.54 
Before considering how these constitutional and prudential standing 
principles have traditionally been applied to severability questions, the next 
section describes the fundamentals of severability doctrine. 
B. Severability 
Severability governs whether a statute that is partially unconstitutional 
is invalid as a whole.55 It asks whether the unconstitutional part can, 
metaphorically speaking, be “severed” from the remainder of the statute. 
Under current severability doctrine,56 the “normal rule” is that the 
unconstitutional part of a statute should be severed, and the remainder 
should be left intact.57 Considerations of statutory interpretation and 
legislative intent, however, can overcome that default rule.58 The principal 
inquiry is whether Congress, had it been aware of the constitutional 
problem, would have “preferred what is left of its statute to no statute at 
all.”59 If Congress would have preferred what is left, the remainder is valid. 
If it would have preferred no statute at all, the remainder is invalid.60 
To understand how the intent-based theory of severability works, 
consider a hypothetical. Suppose that Yellowstone National Park has been 
overwhelmed by extreme levels of traffic and an endless series of protests 
and counter-protests concerning federal environmental policies. Congress 
enacts the following statute: 
 
53 See id. at 415. 
54 See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 501).  
55 See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 19, at 743.  
56 This discussion focuses on the severability of federal statutes, which is a matter of federal law. 
The severability of state statutes is primarily a matter of state law. See Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 
139 (1996) (per curiam). 
57 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010). 
58 See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006) (explaining that the 
“touchstone” for a severability ruling is “legislative intent,” and that “[a]fter finding an application or 
portion of a statute unconstitutional, we must next ask: Would the legislature have preferred what is left 
of its statute to no statute at all?”). 
59 Id. at 330. The Court also asks whether the remainder of the statute can “function[] 
independently” of the unconstitutional part. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 509 (quoting Alaska 
Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)). 
60 See Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330–31. 
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The Yellowstone Act 
(1) Operating a private motor vehicle is prohibited within or in close 
proximity to Yellowstone National Park. Any person who violates this 
provision shall be fined $500. 
(2) Protests concerning federal environmental policies are prohibited within 
Yellowstone National Park. Any person who violates this provision shall be 
fined $500. 
(3) $10 million per year is appropriated to the National Park Service. Those 
funds shall be used solely for the purpose of reporting to Congress on the 
effects of § 1 and § 2 of this Act. 
The private motor vehicle ban in § 1 is likely a constitutionally valid, 
albeit seemingly imprudent, regulation of federal property to the extent that 
it applies within Yellowstone; it might nevertheless exceed Congress’s 
power to the extent that it applies outside the park.61 The protest ban in § 2 
is an unconstitutional content-based regulation of speech.62 And the 
appropriation of funds in § 3 is a lawful exercise of Congress’s spending 
power.63 
Severability principles determine how an unconstitutional provision, 
like the protest ban in § 2, affects the other provisions of the statute. The 
intent-based approach asks whether Congress would have enacted the 
remainder of the Yellowstone Act if it had been aware that the protest ban 
in § 2 violated the First Amendment. If Congress would have enacted the 
remainder—e.g., on the theory that traffic in Yellowstone was a serious 
problem that should be addressed even apart from the ongoing protests—
the protest ban would be severable, and the other provisions of the Act 
would be valid. But if the protest ban were such an integral part of the 
statute that Congress would not have enacted the rest without it—e.g., on 
the theory that a motor vehicle ban alone would lead to more protests and 
make conditions at the park even worse—the remainder of the statute 
would be invalid. 
Severability questions can also arise with respect to different 
applications of a single provision.64 In other words, a court can 
metaphorically “sever” an unconstitutional application of a provision from 
the remaining applications of that provision. For example, if the motor 
vehicle ban in § 1 of the Yellowstone Act is unconstitutional as applied to 
vehicles outside the park, severability principles determine whether § 1 
 
61 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; cf. Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32 (designating land 
in the territories of Montana and Wyoming as Yellowstone National Park). 
62 Cf. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295, 298–99 (1984) (upholding a 
content-neutral regulation issued by the National Park Service against a First Amendment challenge). 
63 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
64 See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 19, at 743–44. 
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remains valid as applied to vehicles inside the park. This inquiry is 
governed by the same intent-based test that applies to the severability of 
provisions.65 
Much like standing doctrine, the Supreme Court has justified existing 
severability principles on the ground that they preserve the separation of 
powers. The Court presumes that the unconstitutional part of a statute is 
severable so that it can “limit the solution to the [constitutional] problem” 
and avoid undue interference with the work of Congress.66 It is nonetheless 
concerned that, when a court severs part of a statute that has a 
constitutional flaw, it can resemble the “quintessentially legislative work” 
of rewriting the statute.67 Severability doctrine ultimately balances these 
separation of powers concerns by looking to the intent of Congress.68 If 
Congress would have favored partial invalidation of a statute, a court 
would not be engaging in improper legislative work by severing the 
unconstitutional part of the statute. But if Congress would have favored 
total invalidation, respect for the separation of powers would require 
striking down the statute as a whole.69 
In recent years, severability doctrine has become increasingly 
important and controversial. For example, the Court’s severability decision 
in United States v. Booker, which transformed the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines into an advisory scheme,70 sparked scholarship criticizing the 
intent-based approach as overly speculative and subject to manipulation 
based on judges’ policy preferences.71 Moreover, in its recent decision in 
 
65 See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 885–86 
(2005); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1950 n.26 (1997). 
66 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006); see also id. at 329 
(“[W]e try not to nullify more of a legislature’s work than is necessary, for we know that ‘[a] ruling of 
unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality opinion))). 
67 Id. at 329. 
68 See id. at 330. 
69 See id.; Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987) (explaining that severance is 
improper if it results in “legislation that Congress would not have enacted”); see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 
2566, 2668 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that, if a court severs 
a statute in a manner that contradicts Congress’s intent, the court “assumes the legislative function” and 
“imposes on the Nation, by the Court’s decree, its own new statutory regime, consisting of policies, 
risks, and duties that Congress did not enact,” which “can be a more extreme exercise of the judicial 
power than striking the whole statute and allowing Congress to address the conditions that pertained 
when the statute was considered at the outset”). 
70 See 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005). 
71 See Walsh, supra note 19, at 750 (observing that Booker was a “spur to critical evaluation of 
severability doctrine” and citing recent scholarship on severability). See generally Tom Campbell, 
Severability of Statutes, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1495 (2011); Tobias A. Dorsey, Remark, Sense and 
Severability, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 877 (2012). For earlier, similar critiques of severability, see, for 
example, John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203 (1993), and Robert L. Stern, 
Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REV. 76 (1937). 
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NFIB, the Court came within a single vote of invalidating the entire 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) on inseverability grounds, and the dissent 
bitterly criticized the majority for ruling that the statute was severable and 
striking down only the portion of the statute that expanded the Medicaid 
program.72 The dissent framed this criticism in separation of powers terms, 
arguing that the Court had engaged in “vast judicial overreaching” by 
severing the statute and “creat[ing] a debilitated, inoperable version of 
health-care regulation that Congress did not enact and the public [did] not 
expect.”73 
Scholars who have criticized the intent-based theory of severability 
have proposed a number of alternative approaches. A common proposal is 
that statutes should be severed absent a clear statement to the contrary in 
the statutory text.74 Other scholars have argued, in contrast, that statutes 
should always be severed,75 or even that statutes should never be severed.76 
Although these approaches would produce different results, they rest on the 
same principle as current doctrine: respect for the separation of powers.77 
Commentators disagree about how severability doctrine should give effect 
to separation of powers interests in practice, but not that severability 
doctrine should give effect to those interests in the first place.78 
Recent controversy has centered on how severability issues should be 
decided. In contrast, as the next section explains, the views of courts and 
scholars on the threshold question of when courts have power to decide 
severability issues—that is, how standing principles apply to severability—
have long been stable and largely uncontroversial. 
 
72 See 132 S. Ct. at 2667–68, 2676 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
73 Id. at 2676; see also id. at 2668 (arguing that the Court had taken “the ACA and this Nation in a 
new direction and charts a course for federalism that the Court, not the Congress, has chosen,” even 
though “under the Constitution, that power and authority do not rest with this Court”). 
74 See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 71, at 254–58; Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inseverability, and 
the Rule of Law, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 227, 272 (2004); Walsh, supra note 19, at 784. 
75 See Dorsey, supra note 71, at 891. 
76 See Campbell, supra note 71, at 1496–97. 
77 See Walsh, supra note 19, at 790 (recognizing that, “[a]t its core,” the debate over severability 
“rests on judgments about how best to implement the separation of powers in the U.S. Constitution”). 
78 Compare, e.g., Campbell, supra note 71, at 1496 (arguing that “traditional separation of powers 
principles” always require total invalidation on the theory that severance is an exercise of legislative 
power because it involves rewriting the statute), with Walsh, supra note 19, at 790 (arguing that courts 
should sever more statutes than under current doctrine because total invalidation is the greater intrusion 
on the separation of powers). 
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C. Standing and Severability 
Severability can arise in two postures, which this Article calls the “as-
applied” posture and the “overbreadth” posture.79 To understand how 
standing principles have traditionally applied to severability questions, 
considering these postures separately is helpful. 
1. As-Applied Posture.—In the as-applied posture, plaintiffs argue 
that the part of a statute that applies to them is unconstitutional, and that 
other parts of the statute are also invalid because the unconstitutional part 
cannot be severed.80 
To illustrate, suppose that a plaintiff, Speaker, challenges the 
hypothetical Yellowstone Act.81 Speaker has concrete plans to protest 
federal environmental policies within Yellowstone, but does not plan to 
operate a private motor vehicle in or around the park. He is therefore 
injured by the protest ban in § 2, but not by the motor vehicle ban in § 1 or 
the appropriation of funds in § 3. In the as-applied posture, Speaker argues 
that the provision of the statute that applies to him (the protest ban in § 2) is 
unconstitutional because it is a content-based regulation of speech, and the 
remainder of the Act is invalid because § 2 is inseverable. Speaker does not 
need to prevail on his inseverability argument to secure relief on his 
constitutional claim. Rather, severability arises only after Speaker prevails 
under the Constitution. 
The severability question in the as-applied posture can concern other 
provisions of the same statute—as when Speaker argues that the protest ban 
in § 2 is unconstitutional and inseverable from the rest of the statute. The 
severability question in this posture can also concern other applications of 
the same provision. For example, Speaker can argue that the protest ban is 
unconstitutional as applied to him because he plans to engage in protected 
speech, and that the protest ban is invalid as a whole because its 
applications to protected speech are inseverable from its applications to 
unprotected speech—e.g., protests involving incitement or defamation.82 
This posture therefore covers both “facial” and “as-applied” constitutional 
challenges. This Article nevertheless refers to it as the “as-applied” posture 
because even when a challenge to a statutory provision is “facial,” a 
plaintiff like Speaker is still arguing that the statute is unconstitutional as 
 
79 Although some scholars have observed that severability questions can arise in different ways, the 
literature has not systematically distinguished between these postures. See Vermeule, supra note 65, at 
1951 (describing “severance proper” and “jus tertii severance” as two different “forms of severance”); 
see also Nagle, supra note 71, at 208–09 (describing contexts in which severability questions can arise). 
80 Cf. Vermeule, supra note 65, at 1951 (describing this posture as “severance proper”). 
81 See supra Part I.B. 
82 Cf. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (describing traditionally unprotected 
categories of speech). 
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applied to him, albeit for a “facial” reason.83 In any event, the key defining 
feature of this posture is that it is arguably unconstitutional to apply the 
statute to the plaintiff, regardless of the outcome on the severability 
question. 
Established practice is that severability can always be decided in the 
as-applied posture, and any potential standing concerns are immaterial. 
That means the court in Speaker’s case can rule on severability after 
deciding that the protest ban is unconstitutional, even though the other 
provisions of the Yellowstone Act do not injure Speaker. 
All nine Justices recently appeared to follow this approach in NFIB. 
The plaintiffs argued that the entire ACA was invalid on inseverability 
grounds.84 The government objected that the plaintiffs lacked standing to 
challenge, on the basis of inseverability, statutory provisions that did not 
apply to them.85 For example, the plaintiff States were injured by the 
expansion of the Medicaid program, but not by the other provisions that 
they sought to invalidate, such as the requirement that insurance coverage 
be provided without regard for preexisting health conditions.86 
After concluding that the Medicaid expansion was unconstitutional, 
however, Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion did not mention the 
standing issue. It instead proceeded directly to consider (and reject) the 
States’ inseverability claim on the merits.87 Justice Ginsburg’s separate 
opinion similarly concluded that the statute was severable without 
addressing standing.88 The dissent, for its part, expressly rejected the 
government’s standing argument, relying on both past practice and 
pragmatic concerns.89 Because the Court was obligated to consider whether 
the requirements of Article III were satisfied before addressing the merits,90 
it is doubtful that the Justices in the majority overlooked the question of 
standing. Rather, the natural conclusion is that the five Justices in the 
 
83 As Professor Fallon has explained, “In order to raise a constitutional objection to a statute, a 
litigant must always assert that the statute’s application to her case violates the Constitution.” Fallon, 
supra note 32, at 1327. A court can use a doctrinal test that “marks the statute as unenforceable in its 
totality,” and thus renders the statute “facially invalid.” See id. at 1327–28. But “[a]s-applied challenges 
are [still] the basic building blocks of constitutional adjudication.” Id. at 1328. 
84 See, e.g., Brief for State Petitioners on Severability at 27–29, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (Nos. 
11-393 & 11-400), 2012 WL 72454, at *27–29. 
85 See Brief for Respondents (Severability) at 14–16, 24–25, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (Nos. 11-393 & 
11-400), 2012 WL 273133, at *14–16, *24–25.  
86 See id. at *22, *24–25; see also Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 
1244 (11th Cir. 2011). 
87 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607–08 (plurality opinion). 
88 See id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
89 See id. at 2671 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
90 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–94 (1998). 
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majority agreed with the four Justices in dissent that standing simply did 
not pose an obstacle to a ruling on severability. 
That conclusion is consistent with previous practice. The Court has 
decided numerous severability questions after ruling that a statute was 
unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff,91 without addressing whether the 
plaintiff had standing to raise severability.92 These decisions have often 
used language suggesting that courts always have the power to decide 
severability questions in this posture.93 Recent scholarship on severability 
similarly asserts or assumes that severability can be decided even when it 
affects only parts of the statute that do not injure the plaintiff.94 
The Court’s decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co. is a particularly striking example of established 
practice in the as-applied posture.95 That case concerned 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1471(b), which granted jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts over a broad 
range of civil proceedings.96 Northern Pipeline filed an action against 
Marathon Pipe Line in bankruptcy court for, inter alia, breach of contract.97 
A plurality of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, concluded that 
§ 1471(b) was unconstitutional as a whole—both because its broad grant of 
jurisdiction to Article I bankruptcy judges violated Article III and because 
its unconstitutional application to Northern’s contract claims against 
 
91 In some of these cases, the party challenging the constitutionality of the statute was the defendant 
in an enforcement action, as noted when particular cases are discussed. Generally, however, this Article 
refers to the party challenging a statute as the “plaintiff” for simplicity. 
92 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508–10 (2010); 
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328–31 (2006); United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186–87 (1992). 
93 See, e.g., Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330 (“After finding an application or portion of a statute 
unconstitutional, we must next ask: Would the legislature have preferred what is left of its statute to no 
statute at all?”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 186 (similar). 
94 See Walsh, supra note 22, at 76–77 (arguing that, if a court rules that the statutory provision that 
injures the plaintiff is unconstitutional, the court can decide whether that provision is severable from 
other provisions that do not injure the plaintiff); see also, e.g., Dorf, supra note 22, at 305 (“Upon 
finding a law unconstitutional, a court must do its best to implement the remaining will of the very 
legislature that enacted the invalid law . . . .”); David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639, 652 (2008) (criticizing the Court for sometimes “ignor[ing] its obligation 
to apply the doctrine” of severability); Ryan Scoville, The New General Common Law of Severability, 
91 TEX. L. REV. 543, 598 (2013) (arguing that Article III limits how to answer severability questions 
because it prohibits a court from excessively rewriting a statute, but assuming that Article III does not 
limit when a court can answer severability questions). Professor Nagle noted in passing that severability 
questions can implicate standing concerns, but did not develop this point. Nagle, supra note 71, at 209–
10 n.30. 
95 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
96 Id. at 54 (plurality opinion). 
97 See id. at 56. 
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Marathon could not be severed from its other applications.98 Justice 
Rehnquist concurred in the judgment. He argued that the Court should hold 
§ 1471(b) unconstitutional only as applied to Northern’s claims against 
Marathon.99 Justice Rehnquist nevertheless agreed that the Court should 
hold § 1471(b) invalid in its entirety because its applications to different 
types of claims were inseverable.100 Thus, even though the statute’s 
applications to other types of claims had no effect on the parties, the Court 
invalidated all of those applications on inseverability grounds. 
This practice of deciding severability in the as-applied posture seems 
to rest, at least in part, on the common assumption that severability is a 
“remedial” question. The Supreme Court and the academic literature have 
described severability as remedial because it affects the scope of the 
remedy that a court will provide for a constitutional violation.101 Indeed, all 
of the Justices adopted that characterization in NFIB.102 The reasoning 
seems to be that, if severability arises only in the remedial phase, after 
standing and the merits have already been considered, any additional 
standing analysis of severability is unnecessary. 
That is not to say, however, that existing practice requires courts to 
make a severability decision when they rule in a plaintiff’s favor on a 
constitutional challenge. Courts often do not even mention severability.103 
That is perhaps because there is little doubt that the statute would be 
 
98 See id. at 87 & n.40 (reasoning that, at the least, the statute was unconstitutional as applied to 
Northern’s “state-law contract claim against Marathon,” and that this application could not be severed 
from the application to other claims). 
99 See id. at 89–91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). 
100 See id. at 91–92. 
101 See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328–31 (2006) 
(repeatedly characterizing the question of severability as one of “remedy”); id. at 328 (severability is 
about “limit[ing] the solution to the problem”); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) 
(describing severability analysis as a “question that concerns the remedy”); Dorf, supra note 22, at 324 
(describing severance as “the remedy for partial invalidation” of statutes); Dorsey, supra note 71, at 891 
(describing severability as a “judicial remedy”); Gans, supra note 94, at 643 (“[Severability] asks a 
remedial question about the scope of the relief a court should order . . . .”). In fact, David Gans has 
argued that severability is “part of the federal common law of constitutional remedies,” and that the 
current test for severability is misplaced because it turns on substantive questions of statutory 
interpretation and legislative intent rather than remedial considerations. See id. at 643–45.  
102 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (plurality opinion) (describing severability as a “decision 
about remedy” (quoting Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330)); id. at 2630, 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (characterizing severability as a question 
regarding the “appropriate remedy”); id. at 2667 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) 
(agreeing that the question of how much of the Medicaid expansion to invalidate on severability 
grounds was a “question of remedy”). 
103 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) (not addressing 
severability after holding that § 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional); Shelby County 
v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (not addressing severability after holding that § 4(b) of the 
Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional). 
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severable, particularly in light of the presumption in favor of severance 
under current law.104 Courts also sometimes note that they are not deciding 
severability because the parties did not raise it.105 The result in these cases 
is to leave the severability issue open for resolution in a subsequent case. 
Moreover, even when the parties raise the issue and the proper 
resolution is unclear, the Court has sometimes concluded that it would be 
inappropriate to make a severability ruling in the as-applied posture. But 
these decisions have declined to address severability on what appeared to 
be prudential grounds, rather than constitutional ones. For example, in 
Printz v. United States, the Court held that the provisions of federal law 
that required state officers to conduct background checks in connection 
with handgun purchases were unconstitutional on anticommandeering 
grounds.106 The plaintiff officers also argued that additional provisions of 
the statute that applied to firearm dealers and purchasers were invalid on 
inseverability grounds.107 The Court decided not to answer that severability 
question because no firearm dealers or purchasers were parties to the 
case.108 It did not mention standing doctrine, and instead stated only that it 
“decline[d] to speculate regarding the rights and obligations of parties not 
before the Court.”109 Particularly in light of its many rulings on severability 
in the as-applied posture, this language suggests that the Court declined to 
decide severability for prudential, third-party standing reasons. In other 
words, the Court felt no obligation to rule on severability, but it did not 
question its power to make such a ruling if there were important reasons to 
do so. The Court has similarly appeared to rely on prudential reasoning to 
avoid rulings on severability in other cases.110 
Thus, under current practice, courts always have the power to rule on 
severability questions in the as-applied posture, even if they do not affect 
any part of the statute that applies to the plaintiff. Courts can nonetheless 
 
104 See Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329. 
105 See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., 
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 n.6 (1989). 
106 See 521 U.S. 898, 902, 933 (1997). 
107 See id. at 935. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 See Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. at 549 (exercising “discretion and prudential judgment” in 
declining to decide a severability issue that had not been briefed); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign 
Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 625–26 (1996) (plurality opinion) (appearing to decline to address 
severability on prudential grounds); United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477–
78 (1995) (reversing the D.C. Circuit’s ruling of inseverability on what appeared to be the prudential 
ground that it was unnecessary to reach the severability question); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 
649 n.6 (1984) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that it would be improper to decide a severability 
question that concerned only the validity of a statutory provision that did not injure the plaintiffs before 
the Court, but framing this conclusion in terms of both Article III power and prudential restraint). 
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decline to decide severability questions in this posture on prudential 
grounds—including that the parties have not raised the issue of 
severability, or that it concerns only the rights of third parties. 
2. Overbreadth Posture.—Unlike the as-applied posture, plaintiffs in 
the overbreadth posture do not argue that the part of the statute that applies 
to them is unconstitutional. Rather, they argue that, even if the part of the 
statute that applies to them is constitutional, that part is invalid because 
some other part of the statute is unconstitutional and cannot be severed.111 
To illustrate, consider again the hypothetical Yellowstone Act,112 and 
suppose that a different plaintiff, Biker, challenges the Act. Biker has 
concrete plans to ride her motorcycle in Yellowstone, but not to protest. 
She is therefore injured by the motor vehicle ban in § 1, but not by the 
protest ban in § 2 or the appropriation of funds in § 3. In the overbreadth 
posture, Biker argues that the motor vehicle ban is invalid because the 
protest ban in § 2 is both unconstitutional and inseverable. Plaintiffs in this 
posture, like Biker, need to prevail on both their constitutional argument 
and their inseverability argument to secure relief. 
The severability question in the overbreadth posture can concern other 
provisions of the same statute—for example, Biker’s claim that the protest 
ban in § 2 is unconstitutional as a whole and inseverable from the motor 
vehicle ban in § 1. The severability question can also concern other 
applications of the same provision. For example, Biker can argue that, even 
if the motor vehicle ban is constitutional as applied to her because she plans 
to ride her motorcycle inside Yellowstone, the ban is unconstitutional as 
applied to vehicles outside the park, and those unconstitutional applications 
cannot be severed. The key defining feature of this posture is that the 
provision or application of the statute that injures the plaintiff is invalid 
only if the statute is inseverable. 
Referring to this as the overbreadth posture reflects that these claims 
are analogous to First Amendment overbreadth claims. Overbreadth 
doctrine permits a plaintiff to obtain relief when a statute has a substantial 
number of applications that violate the First Amendment, even if a more 
narrowly drawn statute could be constitutionally applied to the plaintiff.113 
 
111 Cf. Vermeule, supra note 65, at 1951 (describing this posture as “jus tertii severance”). 
112 See supra Part I.B. 
113 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (explaining that “[i]n the First 
Amendment context,” a law may be invalidated as overbroad if “a substantial number of its applications 
are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep” (quoting Wash. State 
Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008))); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 
U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (explaining that the First Amendment permits “attacks on overly broad statutes 
with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be 
regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity” (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 
U.S. 479, 486 (1965))). 
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That means a plaintiff can, in effect, invoke the constitutional rights of 
third parties to obtain relief.114 For example, suppose that a plaintiff wants 
to engage in an obscene protest inside Yellowstone. Even though obscene 
speech is constitutionally unprotected, the plaintiff could challenge the 
protest ban in § 2 of the Yellowstone Act as overbroad because it applies 
primarily to the protected speech of third parties.115 That claim is 
comparable to Biker’s inseverability claim. Biker effectively argues that 
the protest ban is unconstitutional as applied to third parties, and that she 
should prevail even if a more narrowly drawn statute would be 
constitutional—e.g., a statute that includes the motor vehicle ban, but not 
the protest ban. For these reasons, scholars have recognized that 
inseverability arguments in this posture are analogous to overbreadth 
arguments.116 
Existing practice with respect to a court’s power to rule on severability 
in the overbreadth posture is somewhat less clear than in the as-applied 
posture. Some recent circuit court decisions and scholarship on severability 
have asserted that inseverability claims in the overbreadth posture are 
inconsistent with Article III standing principles.117 But the position of the 
Supreme Court, consistent with the more common view in the academic 
literature, appears to be that inseverability claims in the overbreadth 
posture are permitted under Article III. These claims are therefore subject, 
at most, to prudential limitations on third-party standing. 
The Supreme Court has, albeit rarely, ruled on the merits of 
severability questions that arose in the overbreadth posture. For example, in 
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, the plaintiff airlines challenged provisions of 
§ 43 of the Airline Deregulation Act.118 The plaintiffs did not argue that the 
provisions that injured them were unconstitutional. Instead, they argued 
that the legislative veto provision in § 43(f)—which did not injure them—
 
114 See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610–12. 
115 See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468, 473. 
116 See, e.g., Isserles, supra note 30 at 368–70 (recognizing that overbreadth challenges and 
challenges raising inseverability questions are analogous); Vermeule, supra note 65, at 1967 
(“Overbreadth . . . functions as a doctrine of nonseverability.”); Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional 
Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423, 423–24, 438–40 (1974) (observing that an inseverability argument is 
analogous to an overbreadth argument). 
117 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Tex., Inc. v. Abbott, 647 F.3d 202, 210 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to argue that provisions that did not injure them were 
unconstitutional and inseverable); CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 
1270–74 (11th Cir. 2006) (similar); Walsh, supra note 22, at 75–77 (arguing that a plaintiff lacks 
standing to argue that a statutory provision that does not apply to him is unconstitutional and 
inseverable); see also Campbell, supra note 71, at 1503 (stating that a plaintiff “lacks standing; end of 
argument” in this posture); Dorsey, supra note 71, at 889 (asserting that a challenge in this posture does 
not “make[] any sense”); Fish, supra note 23, at 50 n.146 (assuming that inseverability generally cannot 
be raised in this posture). 
118 See 480 U.S. 678, 680, 683 (1987). 
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was unconstitutional and inseverable from the remainder of § 43.119 The 
Court disagreed with the plaintiffs on the merits and severed the legislative 
veto provision.120 But the Court never suggested that the plaintiffs faced a 
standing problem. It instead appeared to assume that the plaintiffs had 
Article III standing to challenge the provisions that injured them, and that 
they could therefore challenge those provisions on inseverability 
grounds.121 In other decisions, the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals 
have similarly ruled on the merits of severability questions in the 
overbreadth posture.122 
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine also confirms that plaintiffs 
raising inseverability claims in this posture do not face any sort of special 
Article III standing problem. It is commonly understood that First 
Amendment overbreadth claims are consistent with Article III, and that 
overbreadth is an exception only to prudential limitations on third-party 
standing.123 In other words, when a plaintiff is injured by a statute, the 
plaintiff has Article III standing to challenge it, including by raising an 
overbreadth claim. And even if the court rejects that claim on the ground 
 
119 See id. at 683. 
120 See id. at 697. 
121 Professor Walsh has observed that the plaintiffs in Alaska Airlines also challenged 
administrative regulations that had been issued pursuant to § 43, and that those regulations were subject 
to the legislative veto provision in § 43(f). See Walsh, supra note 22, at 75–76. It might therefore have 
been possible to view the severability question as arising in the as-applied posture on the theory that the 
regulations were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, however, viewed the severability question as 
arising in the overbreadth posture because the Court framed the case as a challenge to the provisions of 
§ 43, rather than to the regulations. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 680 (“[Plaintiffs] contend that 
provisions protecting employees in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 . . . are ineffective . . . .”); id. 
at 683 n.5 (describing the “issue at hand” as the severability of the “remaining provisions”). 
122 See Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 77 (1961) 
(holding that provisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 were severable); Elec. Bond 
& Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 439 (1938) (holding that provisions of the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935 were severable); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 286–87, 289, 304, 
310–16 (1936) (holding that tax provisions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 that 
injured the challengers were invalid because the labor provisions and price-fixing provisions of the 
statute were unconstitutional and inseverable); Local 514 Transp. Workers Union of Am. v. Keating, 
358 F.3d 743, 749–50 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that the plaintiffs had standing to raise an inseverability 
argument in the overbreadth posture); Catholic Soc. Serv. v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 1123, 1125–26 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (similar). Professor Walsh has argued that the Supreme Court refused to consider inseverability 
arguments in the overbreadth posture in Communist Party of the United States and Electric Bond & 
Share Co. See Walsh, supra note 22, at 76. But the Court in those cases held that the statutes were 
severable, rather than holding that the severability questions were not properly before it. See Communist 
Party of the U.S., 367 U.S. at 70, 76–77; Elec. Bond & Share Co., 303 U.S. at 439. 
123 See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611–12 (1973) (describing overbreadth as an 
exception to third-party-standing limitations); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 
100 YALE L.J. 853, 869 (1991) (recognizing that overbreadth is consistent with Article III); Isserles, 
supra note 30, at 368–70 (characterizing overbreadth as an exception to the third-party standing rule); 
Note, supra note 116, at 438–40 (characterizing an overbreadth claimant as raising the rights of third 
parties and challenging the application of the statute to third parties). 
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that the statute is not overbroad, that is a ruling on the merits, not a ruling 
that the plaintiff lacks standing. For example, in Virginia v. Hicks, the 
Supreme Court explained that deciding whether a statute is overbroad is not 
a decision on standing, but instead “the determination of a First 
Amendment challenge on the merits.”124 
As decisions such as Alaska Airlines reflect, Article III applies in the 
same way to a plaintiff raising an inseverability claim in the overbreadth 
posture. If the plaintiff is injured by the statute, the plaintiff has Article III 
standing to challenge it, including by raising an inseverability claim. 
Scholars have therefore described inseverability, like overbreadth, as an 
exception to limitations on third-party standing.125 In fact, some have gone 
even further, arguing that plaintiffs in the overbreadth posture are not 
asserting the rights of third parties at all, and are instead asserting their own 
right not to be penalized under an invalid statute.126 Either way, these 
scholars agree that plaintiffs in this posture have Article III standing, 
whether they are raising an overbreadth claim or an inseverability claim. 
And even if a court rejects an inseverability claim on the ground that the 
statute is severable, that is also a ruling on the merits, rather than a ruling 
that the plaintiff lacks standing. 
Indeed, it would be odd if a plaintiff had Article III standing to raise an 
overbreadth claim, but lacked Article III standing to raise an inseverability 
claim. The test for Article III standing is centered on the injury in fact 
requirement, and whether plaintiffs have suffered an injury in fact does not 
depend on which substantive arguments they raise.127 To be sure, if the 
Court adopted then-Professor Fletcher’s proposal to abandon the injury in 
fact test and treat standing as a question of the merits, standing would 
depend on which substantive argument the plaintiff raises.128 Rather than 
accept this invitation to restructure standing doctrine, however, the Court 
 
124 539 U.S. 113, 120 (2003) (brackets omitted) (quoting Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. 
Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 958–59 (1984)). 
125 See, e.g., Isserles, supra note 30, at 368 (“This is technically an exception to the rules barring 
third-party standing because the litigant must invoke unconstitutional applications of the statute against 
third parties to prove the case of statutory inseverability.”); Note, supra note 116, at 438–40 & n.82 
(similar). 
126 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 83, at 1348–49, 1360–61, 1369 (observing that, if a statute is 
severable, the third-party standing rule is not necessary to explain why the plaintiff loses in this 
posture); Metzger, supra note 65, at 889 & n.68 (recognizing that severability is a substantive question 
that determines the outcome on the merits in the overbreadth posture); Henry Paul Monaghan, 
Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3 (arguing that overbreadth is not a special standing doctrine); see 
also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 80 n.3 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the 
related question of when a statute should be invalidated on its face as a question of “substantive law,” 
not “a question of standing”). 
127 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 78–79 (1978). 
128 See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 223–24. 
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has remained committed to the injury in fact requirement.129 Under current 
practice, therefore, a plaintiff who suffers an injury in fact from a statute 
has Article III standing to raise both overbreadth and inseverability.130 
It is true that inseverability and overbreadth are not identical. 
Overbreadth provides special protection for speech rights on the theory that 
those rights are particularly prone to chilling effects from expansively 
written statutes.131 It permits a statute to be struck down in its entirety if it 
covers too much protected speech, even if the statute’s applications are 
severable as a matter of legislative intent.132 Overbreadth is therefore a way 
to overcome the severability of a statute when the freedom of speech is at 
stake. 
Inseverability and overbreadth nevertheless have the same effect in the 
posture considered here. Both permit a plaintiff whose own conduct is not 
constitutionally privileged to challenge a statute because it covers conduct 
that is constitutionally privileged.133 Thus, if a plaintiff like Biker succeeds 
on an inseverability claim, resort to an overbreadth claim is unnecessary, 
and vice versa. From the perspective of Article III standing doctrine, 
therefore, inseverability claims in this posture are equivalent to First 
Amendment overbreadth claims. 
It is also true that overbreadth claims are typically directed at the 
applications of a single provision, whereas an inseverability claim can be 
directed at different provisions. Although that might make a difference for 
purposes of prudential standing rules, it should not make a difference for 
purposes of Article III. For example, if Biker argues that the protest ban is 
unconstitutional and inseverable from the motor vehicle ban, she is still 
seeking to redress her injury from the motor vehicle ban. She therefore has 
Article III standing for this claim. Indeed, given that Congress cannot 
revise constitutional standing principles,134 it would be counterintuitive if 
Biker’s Article III standing turned on whether Congress chose to codify the 
motor vehicle ban and the protest ban in separate provisions. That choice 
might, however, affect the application of third-party standing rules, which 
 
129 See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013); Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563–64 (1992). 
130 Cf., e.g., WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, 308 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that 
the plaintiffs raised only one “claim” for purposes of standing because they challenged a single 
government leasing decision, even though they “advance[d] several arguments in support of that 
claim”); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 47–48 (1st Cir. 2011) (similar). 
131 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010); Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 
(2003). 
132 See Hicks, 539 U.S. at 121–22 (explaining that, even if a statute was severable, it could still be 
overbroad). 
133 See Isserles, supra note 30, at 369–71. 
134 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997). 
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Congress can alter.135 A court could reasonably be more cautious, as a 
prudential matter, when a plaintiff like Biker seeks a ruling on the 
constitutionality of a provision that does not apply to her. Such a claim 
could easily be in tension with the separation of powers and sound 
decisionmaking interests that standing doctrine is meant to serve. 
Claims in the overbreadth posture also seem to be rare in practice.136 
But they do happen,137 and their infrequency does not mean that the 
overbreadth posture is inconsistent with Article III.138 One explanation for 
the rarity of claims in the overbreadth posture is that severability can 
always be raised in the as-applied posture, so litigants have not needed to 
use the overbreadth posture to obtain rulings on severability. Another is 
that severability is often described as a “remedial” question when it arises 
in the as-applied posture.139 That may have caused litigants simply to 
overlook that severability can also be raised in the overbreadth posture, in 
which it operates more like a merits question.140 
 
 * * * 
 
There is a basic symmetry between established practice for 
severability in the as-applied posture and the overbreadth posture. In both 
postures, Article III allows plaintiffs to raise severability questions. But 
courts are not required to decide severability questions in either posture, 
and instead can limit their consideration of severability issues based on 
prudential standing principles, including third-party standing rules. 
Existing practice on severability, however, has not yet taken account 
of a recent development in the law of standing—the Supreme Court’s 
categorical adoption of a claim-specific approach. Before considering how 
that approach applies to severability in Part III, Part II introduces the claim-
specific approach and an alternative approach that the Court could have 
adopted—supplemental standing. 
 
135 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997). 
136 Cf. Walsh, supra note 22, at 76–77 (arguing that there is no precedent for inseverability claims 
in the overbreadth posture). 
137 See supra Part I.C.2. 
138 Contra Walsh, supra note 22, at 76–77 (arguing that the overbreadth posture conflicts with 
Article III). 
139 See supra notes 101–102. 
140 For example, when the Court decided a severability question in the overbreadth posture in 
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987), it appeared to treat severability as a merits issue, 
and it did not refer to severability as a remedial matter. 
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II. CLAIM-SPECIFIC STANDING VS. SUPPLEMENTAL STANDING 
Setting aside for now the question of severability, suppose that Biker 
challenges the hypothetical Yellowstone Act and argues that both the motor 
vehicle ban in § 1 and the protest ban in § 2 are unconstitutional. How 
should the court proceed given that Biker is injured only by the motor 
vehicle ban? 
The Supreme Court has adopted a claim-specific approach to standing 
that requires plaintiffs to have Article III standing for every claim that they 
raise.141 Under that approach, Biker would be viewed as raising two claims 
because she is challenging two provisions as unconstitutional.142 Biker 
would therefore be required to establish standing for both claims—meaning 
that she would need to demonstrate that both provisions injure her.143 
Because she is injured only by the motor vehicle ban, she would have 
standing to challenge only that provision, and the court could not decide 
whether the protest ban is unconstitutional. 
This Part lays the groundwork for scrutinizing this claim-specific 
approach to standing. It first explains that the text of Article III does not 
require a claim-specific approach, and instead also permits the more 
flexible concept of “supplemental standing.” It then explores the decisions 
in which the Court has nonetheless adopted the claim-specific theory and 
rejected the supplemental-standing approach. 
A. The Text of Article III Permits Claim-Specific Standing or 
Supplemental Standing 
Even assuming that an Article III “case” or “controversy” exists only 
if the plaintiff has standing, the text of Article III does not specify how the 
standing requirement should apply in cases involving multiple claims. It is 
possible to interpret “case” narrowly—as the claim-specific approach 
effectively does—to include only claims that the plaintiff has standing to 
raise.144 Under that interpretation, the injury in fact requirement both 
defines when a case exists, and establishes the outer boundaries of a case 
for purposes of Article III. 
Although that interpretation is possible, it is not textually required. 
Article III can also support a broader interpretation of a “case” that would 
permit a plaintiff to assert multiple claims, even if only one of those claims 
satisfies the test for standing. Under this approach, standing would still be 
necessary to give rise to an Article III case. But such a case could also 
 
141 See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352–53 (2006). 
142 See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 733–34 (2008). 
143 See id. 
144 See Cuno, 547 U.S. at 352 (holding that Article III does not grant jurisdiction “over a claim that 
does not itself satisfy . . . constitutional standing” requirements). 
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include other claims that the plaintiff would lack standing to bring on their 
own. That means the injury in fact requirement would still define when a 
case exists, but would not establish the outer boundaries of a case under 
Article III. 
This broader interpretation of an Article III “case” is not purely 
theoretical. The Supreme Court has long embraced an analogous 
interpretation of an Article III “case” under the doctrine of supplemental 
jurisdiction. Article III grants the federal courts power over “Cases” and 
“Controversies” that fall within nine categories of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, including cases arising under federal law, and controversies in 
which the parties are diverse.145 But it is well established that a case can 
include claims that do not themselves fall within one of these nine 
categories. The Court held, in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 
that a court with jurisdiction over a federal claim can also exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim, even if the parties are not 
diverse.146 The federal and state law claims fall within the same 
constitutional “case,” the Court explained, if they arise from a “common 
nucleus of operative fact.”147 Thus, the categories in Article III define when 
a federal court has jurisdiction over a case, but the “common nucleus of 
operative fact” standard defines which claims fall within the boundaries of 
such a case. 
The text of Article III could also support a similar “supplemental 
standing” approach.148 The central principle of supplemental standing 
would be that, if a plaintiff had standing for one claim, the plaintiff’s 
Article III case could also include claims that would not themselves satisfy 
the test for standing. Again, standing would still define when a 
constitutional case exists. But some criterion other than standing—perhaps, 
for example, the Gibbs standard of a common nucleus of operative fact—
would define the outer limits of the case. 
In fact, this supplemental-standing approach not only is textually 
permissible, but also is ultimately more faithful to the text than a claim-
specific approach to standing. Article III speaks in terms of “cases,” not 
“claims.” That suggests federal jurisdiction should be determined on a 
case-specific basis, rather than a claim-specific basis—as the Court has 
long held for purposes of supplemental jurisdiction. 
 
145 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
146 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). 
147 Id. 
148 Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the 
Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 22 n.115 (1984) (hinting at such a concept by arguing 
that requests for different remedies arising from the same operative facts would be part of the same 
Article III “case”); Laura E. Little, It’s About Time: Unravelling Standing and Equitable Ripeness, 
41 BUFF. L. REV. 933, 974 & n.182 (1993) (similar). 
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The Supreme Court has nevertheless adopted a claim-specific 
approach to standing, and recently rejected the concept of supplemental 
standing. The Court has not argued that a claim-specific theory of standing 
is textually required, or even preferred by the text. Instead, as the next 
section explains, the Court initially appeared to adopt the claim-specific 
approach almost by accident, and has since attempted to justify it based on 
past practice and functional considerations. 
B. The Supreme Court Has Adopted Claim-Specific Standing and  
Rejected Supplemental Standing 
1. Early Decisions.—In the 1970s, at about the same time that it 
began to embrace the injury in fact requirement as part of standing 
doctrine,149 the Court began to adopt a claim-specific approach to standing 
that required plaintiffs to establish an injury in fact for every claim that 
they raised. For several decades, the Court provided little justification for 
this approach, and instead presented it almost as a fait accompli. 
The claim-specific approach to standing can be traced to Moose Lodge 
No. 107 v. Irvis.150 In that case, the Court held that the plaintiff had standing 
to challenge a fraternal club’s policy regarding the service of guests 
because the club had refused to serve the plaintiff based on his race.151 But 
the plaintiff could not, the Court held, challenge the club’s membership 
policy because he had never sought to become a member, and the 
membership policy therefore had not injured him.152 Although that holding 
appeared to assume that standing is claim-specific, the Court did not make 
that assumption explicit. Nor did it address the text of Article III or the 
possibility of supplemental standing. 
A decade later, in Blum v. Yaretsky, the Court similarly held that a 
group of plaintiffs had standing for some of their claims, but not others.153 
In particular, the plaintiff Medicaid patients were allowed to challenge 
decisions by nursing homes to transfer them to a lower level of care, but 
not decisions to transfer them to a higher level of care.154 The Court 
asserted that “a plaintiff who has been subject to injurious conduct of one 
kind [does not] possess[] by virtue of that injury the necessary stake in 
litigating conduct of another kind, although similar, to which he has not 
 
149 See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970) (adopting the 
injury in fact requirement). 
150 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
151 Id. at 168. 
152 See id. at 166–68, 171. 
153 457 U.S. 991, 1000–02 (1982).  
154 See id. 
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been subject.”155 That assertion appears to embrace a claim-specific 
approach to standing. But the Court did not explain why such an approach 
was required, and instead merely cited Moose Lodge. 
Shortly thereafter, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Court extended 
the claim-specific approach to the remedial context and held, without 
explanation, that plaintiffs must have Article III standing for every remedy 
that they seek.156 The Los Angeles police had stopped the plaintiff in Lyons 
for a traffic violation and, without provocation, applied a chokehold that 
rendered him unconscious.157 The plaintiff sued for both damages and an 
injunction against the future use of chokeholds.158 The Court acknowledged 
that the plaintiff had standing to seek damages for his injuries, but held that 
he lacked standing to seek an injunction because the threat that the police 
would choke him again was too remote.159 It thus assumed that the plaintiff 
was required to establish standing for both types of relief. Justice White’s 
majority opinion did not cite any authority for that assumption—even 
though Justice Marshall’s dissent disputed it and argued that separate 
standing was not required for the injunctive claim.160 
Several years later, in Lewis v. Casey, the Court held that the claim-
specific approach to standing also limits the scope of the remedy that a 
court can provide for a constitutional violation.161 The plaintiff prisoners in 
Lewis alleged that the law libraries in their prisons were inadequate.162 The 
district court agreed, and entered an injunction that required the State of 
Arizona to provide better services for prisoners on “lockdown” status, 
illiterate prisoners, and non-English-speaking prisoners.163 The Supreme 
Court held that the scope of the injunction exceeded the district court’s 
authority under Article III.164 The only cognizable injury the plaintiffs had 
established, the Court held, was caused by the failure to provide special 
services for illiterate inmates.165 Justice Scalia wrote for the Court that 
“standing is not dispensed in gross,” and relied on Blum for the proposition 
that standing to challenge one form of conduct does not imply standing to 
challenge a different form of conduct.166 
 
155 Id. at 999. 
156 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983). 
157 Id. at 97–98. 
158 Id. at 98. 
159 See id. at 106 n.7, 109. 
160 See id. at 126–30 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
161 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996). 
162 See id. at 346. 
163 See id. at 347–48. 
164 See id. at 358–60. 
165 See id. at 358. 
166 Id. at 358 n.6. 
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2. Recent Developments.—Although the Supreme Court applied a 
claim-specific approach to standing in Moose Lodge, Blum, Lyons, and 
Lewis, those decisions did not address the potential concept of 
supplemental standing, and thus did not expressly reject it. Those decisions 
also left open several questions regarding the claim-specific approach to 
standing, including how it would apply in constitutional challenges to 
statutes. The Court has recently addressed these potential sources of 
uncertainty. 
The Court categorically dismissed the concept of supplemental 
standing in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno.167 The plaintiffs in that case 
asserted a Commerce Clause challenge against state and municipal tax 
benefits that had been granted to DaimlerChrysler pursuant to state statutes 
in Ohio.168 The Court held that, even assuming the plaintiffs had standing to 
challenge the municipal tax benefits, they could not challenge the state tax 
benefits, which did not cause them a sufficient injury.169 Standing was not 
“commutative,” the Court decided, and concepts drawn from the doctrine 
of supplemental jurisdiction could not be used to define an Article III 
“case” for purposes of standing analysis.170 
Cuno asserted that its rejection of supplemental standing was dictated, 
at least in part, by past practice. It relied on decisions such as Lyons and 
Lewis for the proposition that standing is claim-specific.171 The Court also 
asserted that it had “never” previously permitted “a federal court to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim that does not itself satisfy 
those elements of the Article III inquiry, such as constitutional standing, 
that serve to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved 
through the judicial process.”172 
Perhaps because its prior decisions had not directly addressed the 
concept of supplemental standing, the Court in Cuno also offered its own 
functional justification for rejecting that concept in favor of the claim-
specific approach.173 According to the Court, the claim-specific approach 
reinforces the purposes of standing doctrine, including the separation of 
powers.174 It expressed concern that, if plaintiffs were not required to have 
 
167 547 U.S. 332 (2006). 
168 See id. at 337–39. 
169 Id. at 350. The question of whether the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the municipal tax 
benefits was not before the Court. See id. at 340, 349. The Court also held that the plaintiffs lacked 
independent standing under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), to challenge the state tax benefits based 
on their status as state taxpayers. See Cuno, 547 U.S. at 342–49. 
170 See Cuno, 547 U.S. at 352. 
171 See id. at 35253. 
172 Id. at 35152 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). 
173 See id. at 35253. 
174 See id. at 352. 
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standing for every claim, they could easily evade the limits of Article III. 
Courts would be permitted to “decid[e] issues they would not otherwise be 
authorized to decide,” and a litigant could, “by virtue of his standing to 
challenge one government action, challenge other governmental actions 
that did not injure him.”175 In those circumstances, the separation of powers 
“would quickly erode,” and the Court’s “emphasis on the standing 
requirement’s role in maintaining this separation would be rendered hollow 
rhetoric.”176 
Cuno also helped to clarify how the claim-specific approach to 
standing applies when a plaintiff challenges multiple statutory provisions as 
unconstitutional. The Court treated the plaintiffs’ challenge to the 
municipal tax benefits and their challenge to the state tax benefits as 
separate “claims” for purposes of the claim-specific analysis.177 It therefore 
appeared to conclude that plaintiffs must establish standing for each 
provision of a statute that they challenge. In other words, the Court 
suggested that a “claim” for purposes of the claim-specific approach to 
standing is defined on a provision-specific basis, rather than some other 
basis, such as a statute-specific one. 
The Court confirmed that conclusion in Davis v. FEC.178 In that case, 
the plaintiff argued that two provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002 violated the First Amendment.179 Section 319(a) relaxed the 
limits on campaign contributions for congressional candidates whose 
opponents expended personal funds above a certain threshold, and § 319(b) 
required self-financing candidates to make disclosures about their 
expenditures.180 The Court reaffirmed the claim-specific approach to 
standing and, consistent with Cuno, held that the plaintiff was required to 
establish standing for each provision that he challenged.181 It ultimately 
concluded that the plaintiff had standing to challenge both provisions.182 
In sum, the Court recently adopted the claim-specific approach to 
standing as a categorical matter, and asserted that this approach is both 
consistent with existing practice and necessary to advance the purposes of 
standing doctrine. As the next section explains, however, the manner in 
which the Court has applied the claim-specific approach in constitutional 
challenges to statutes would conflict with existing practice on severability, 
 
175 Id. at 353 & n.5. 
176 Id. at 353 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982)). 
177 Id. at 350. 
178 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
179 Id. at 733–34. 
180 See id. at 729–30. 
181 See id. at 733–34. 
182 See id. at 733–35. 
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and would ultimately undermine the objectives of standing doctrine in 
severability cases. 
III. CLAIM-SPECIFIC STANDING AND SEVERABILITY 
Both of the Supreme Court’s rationales for the claim-specific approach 
to standing—consistency with past practice, and reinforcing the aims of 
standing doctrine—break down in the context of severability doctrine. In 
fact, the claim-specific approach to standing conflicts with established 
practice on severability. Under current practice, if a plaintiff has standing to 
challenge a statute, Article III always permits a ruling on severability in 
both the as-applied and overbreadth postures. The plaintiff need not, in 
other words, make an additional showing of standing to raise an argument 
about severability. But the claim-specific approach would treat severability 
in the as-applied posture as an independent claim that the plaintiff would 
need standing to raise—which means that Article III would often prevent a 
court from ruling on severability in the as-applied posture. At the same 
time, the claim-specific approach would not impose that constitutional 
limitation in the overbreadth posture. The result would be an unexpected 
asymmetry: Article III standing principles would make it harder to rule on 
severability in the as-applied posture than in the overbreadth posture. 
These changes to established practice on severability would contradict 
the purposes of standing doctrine. Preventing severability rulings in the as-
applied posture would interfere with the separation of powers because a 
ruling on severability is often necessary to give effect to Congress’s intent. 
It would also do little, if anything, to advance the interest in sound 
decisionmaking. Moreover, the claim-specific approach would allow 
rulings in the overbreadth posture, even though that posture is far more 
suspect from the perspective of standing principles because it permits 
plaintiffs to challenge provisions that do not even apply to them. Although 
existing practice also allows claims in the overbreadth posture, the claim-
specific approach would channel more severability claims into the 
overbreadth posture because the as-applied posture could no longer serve 
as an outlet for severability rulings. In the process, it would do considerable 
damage to the interests in the separation of powers and accurate judicial 
decisions. 
A. Claim-Specific Standing Conflicts with Practice on Severability 
1. Severability Is Sometimes a Claim.—The claim-specific approach 
requires plaintiffs to have standing for every claim that they raise. The 
Supreme Court’s decisions adopting that approach—as well as background 
standing theory—make clear that an argument about severability is a 
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separate claim that requires standing in the as-applied posture, but not in 
the overbreadth posture. 
To understand how the claim-specific approach to standing works in 
the as-applied posture, consider Speaker and our hypothetical Yellowstone 
Act.183 Suppose initially that Speaker argues that (1) the protest ban is 
unconstitutional, and (2) the motor vehicle ban is unconstitutional. If 
Speaker prevailed on both arguments, the court would invalidate both 
provisions. Under Cuno and Davis, however, Speaker must have Article III 
standing for each provision that he challenges. Because he is not injured by 
the motor vehicle ban, he cannot argue that it is unconstitutional, and the 
court cannot strike it down. 
Now suppose that Speaker argues that (1) the protest ban is 
unconstitutional, and (2) the motor vehicle ban is invalid because the 
protest ban cannot be severed. If Speaker prevailed on both arguments, the 
effect would be the same as above: The court would invalidate both 
provisions. The claim-specific standing analysis should therefore be the 
same. It would treat Speaker as raising two claims—a constitutional 
challenge to the protest ban, and an inseverability challenge to the motor 
vehicle ban—and he would need standing for each. Because he is not 
injured by the motor vehicle ban, Speaker could not argue that it is invalid 
on inseverability grounds. Thus, the court would be barred, as a 
constitutional matter, from ruling on severability. 
To be sure, Cuno and Davis did not directly address inseverability 
arguments, and instead addressed arguments that multiple provisions were 
unconstitutional.184 But it is hard to see why that distinction should make a 
difference. If the claim-specific approach requires Speaker to have standing 
to argue that the motor vehicle ban is invalid because it is unconstitutional, 
it also would seem to require Speaker to have standing to argue that the 
motor vehicle ban is invalid on any other ground, including inseverability. 
Indeed, the Court’s principal concern in adopting the claim-specific 
standing theory has been to prevent plaintiffs from invalidating statutory 
provisions or government actions that do not injure them185—which is 
exactly the effect of Speaker’s inseverability argument. A faithful 
application of the claim-specific approach would therefore prohibit a court 
 
183 See supra Part I.B. 
184 See Davis, 554 U.S. at 736, 740, 744; DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 338–39 
(2006). 
185 See, e.g., Cuno, 547 U.S. at 353 & n.5 (holding that a plaintiff cannot, “by virtue of his standing 
to challenge one government action, challenge other governmental actions that did not injure him”); 
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (holding that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge only the 
“particular inadequacy in government administration” that caused their injury, as opposed to “all 
inadequacies in that administration”). 
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from ruling on the severability question in Speaker’s case in the as-applied 
posture. 
The application of the claim-specific approach would lead to a 
different conclusion in the overbreadth posture. To understand why, 
consider Biker’s challenge to the Yellowstone Act. Biker argues that the 
motor vehicle ban in § 1 is invalid because the protest ban in § 2 is 
unconstitutional and inseverable. As explained earlier, even though Biker is 
not injured by the protest ban, existing practice on both severability and 
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine grants her Article III standing to 
raise that argument.186 
The claim-specific approach to standing would do nothing to change 
that conclusion. Even under that approach, Biker is effectively raising only 
a single claim—that the motor vehicle ban is invalid. It happens that her 
substantive theory for why the motor vehicle is invalid involves arguments 
about the constitutionality and severability of the protest ban. But those 
arguments are still directed toward redressing Biker’s injury from the 
motor vehicle ban. She therefore has Article III standing to raise them, just 
as she would have Article III standing to argue that the motor vehicle ban is 
unconstitutional. And it makes no difference for constitutional purposes 
whether she is injured by the protest ban. Although she might face a 
prudential, third-party standing problem when raising an inseverability 
claim concerning the protest ban, she would not face an Article III standing 
problem. 
Any other conclusion would cast substantial doubt on the continued 
viability of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. As explained earlier, it 
is well established that overbreadth claims are consistent with Article III 
and are at most an exception to prudential limitations on third-party 
standing.187 And Biker’s inseverability claim is equivalent to an 
overbreadth claim for standing purposes. The claim-specific approach to 
standing therefore could not impose Article III limitations on Biker’s 
inseverability claim—i.e., by requiring her to show an injury in fact from 
the protest ban—without imposing similar limitations on overbreadth 
claims. But the Court’s claim-specific standing decisions do not suggest 
that they are in any way inconsistent with existing overbreadth doctrine. 
In fact, Cuno strongly suggested that the claim-specific approach to 
standing does not affect the theory underlying overbreadth claims (or 
inseverability claims in the overbreadth posture). The Court took care to 
state that it was not displacing lower court decisions holding that, if a 
plaintiff has standing to challenge government action, the plaintiff “may do 
 
186 See supra Part I.C.2. 
187 See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611–12 (1973). 
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so by identifying all grounds on which” that action is unlawful.188 That 
language suggests that a plaintiff who is injured by a statutory provision 
has Article III standing to challenge that provision on any ground, 
including an overbreadth claim. The same conclusion would apply to 
inseverability claims in the overbreadth posture. Biker is injured by the 
motor vehicle ban, and she would therefore have Article III standing to 
challenge it on any ground, including that the protest ban is 
unconstitutional and inseverable. 
Ultimately, the difference between Speaker and Biker (and the as-
applied and overbreadth postures) is this: Speaker is arguing that the 
provision that injures him is invalid and the statute is inseverable. Biker is 
arguing that the provision that injures her is invalid because the statute is 
inseverable. The Court’s claim-specific approach to standing would treat 
this difference as dispositive, and would therefore require Speaker, but not 
Biker, to establish an injury in fact with respect to both the protest ban and 
the motor vehicle ban. 
The claim-specific standing approach would therefore create a new 
distinction between the as-applied and overbreadth postures. Established 
practice is that Article III standing principles always permit severability 
rulings in both postures. Under the claim-specific approach to standing, 
Article III standing principles would limit severability rulings in the as-
applied posture, but not in the overbreadth posture. 
2. Severability Is Not a Remedy.—The previous section concluded 
that severability is a “claim” for purposes of the claim-specific standing 
analysis when it arises in the as-applied posture. But courts and scholars 
have often characterized severability as a remedial inquiry in this posture.189 
That might suggest a way to reconcile the claim-specific standing theory 
with established practice on severability: If severability is remedial, then 
perhaps it would not be a claim that requires a showing of standing under 
the claim-specific theory after all. 
For several reasons, however, the characterization of severability as a 
remedial question cannot bear close scrutiny. Rather, severability is best 
viewed as a substantive claim that goes to the merits of the plaintiff’s case. 
And when the remedial characterization of severability is set aside, it 
confirms that the claim-specific approach to standing is inconsistent with 
settled practice on severability. 
As an initial matter, a severability ruling is not about which type of 
remedy to provide to the plaintiff. It is not about whether to provide an 
injunction, or a declaratory judgment, or damages. Courts and scholars 
 
188 Cuno, 547 U.S. at 353 n.5. 
189 See supra notes 101–02. 
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have rightly observed that a severability ruling can affect the scope of the 
remedy.190 It can determine, for example, whether a declaratory judgment 
will cover part of the statute, or all of it. But that is the hallmark of a 
substantive, merits question.191 Constitutional rulings regarding different 
provisions of a statute determine the scope of the court’s remedy, but that 
does not mean that those constitutional rulings should be characterized as 
remedial. So, too, for severability. 
The test for severability also is not remedial. It turns on substantive 
questions of statutory interpretation and legislative intent.192 Remedial 
questions, in contrast, consider how to compensate plaintiffs for harm they 
have suffered, or how to prevent future harm to plaintiffs.193 In other words, 
the law of remedies assumes that the plaintiff has suffered or will suffer a 
substantive wrong, and asks how to fix it. Severability doctrine, in contrast, 
determines whether the plaintiff has suffered a substantive wrong at all, or 
the extent of that wrong.194 
Moreover, the precedential effect of a severability ruling is not 
equivalent to the precedential effect of a remedial ruling. A ruling that a 
 
190 See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006) (severability 
is about “limit[ing] the solution to the problem”); Gans, supra note 94, at 643 (“[Severability] asks a 
remedial question about the scope of the relief a court should order . . . .”). 
191 The Article’s argument assumes that justiciability, substantive, and remedial doctrines are 
distinct. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And Their 
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 647 (2006) (drawing the same distinction). 
Scholars have nevertheless observed that substantive rulings can influence courts’ rulings on standing 
or remedies, and vice versa. See id. at 636–37; Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial 
Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999). Thus, even when severability is properly viewed as a 
substantive question, it may still influence a court’s ruling on standing or remedies. This Article argues, 
however, that a problem arises when severability is characterized as remedial because it can create 
confusion about how to apply standing doctrine. 
192 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508–10 (2010); 
Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 238 (1994) 
(“Generally, severability is a question of statutory interpretation, not constitutional law.”); Nagle, supra 
note 71, at 226 (“[S]everability is properly considered a question of statutory construction . . . .”). 
193 See generally DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 3–5 (4th ed. 2010) 
(describing the objectives of the various types of remedies). In fact, commentators who have argued that 
severability should be characterized as a remedial inquiry have also recognized that, to fit that 
characterization, the test for severability would need to change to turn on remedial considerations, 
rather than statutory interpretation and legislative intent. See Gans, supra note 94, at 643–45 (arguing 
that “severability should not simply be a matter of divining the intent of the legislature,” and courts 
“must play a more active role in answering the remedial question whether or not to sever”); see also 
Kent Barnett, To the Victor Goes the Toil—Remedies for Regulated Parties in Separation-of-Powers 
Litigation, 92 N.C. L. REV. 481, 484–86, 518–21 (2014) (characterizing severability rulings in cases 
such as Free Enterprise Fund as remedial rulings, and arguing that the Supreme Court should change its 
approach to severability to account for “remedial values”). 
194 Cf., e.g., Metzger, supra note 65, at 884–85 (suggesting that severability analysis is substantive 
by explaining that severability determines whether applications of the statute are “invalid”); Vermeule, 
supra note 65, at 1951 (similar). 
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plaintiff is entitled, for example, to an injunction as a remedy against a 
particular wrong has precedential effect only for other persons who have 
suffered a similar wrong.195 A ruling that a statute is wholly invalid on 
inseverability grounds, in contrast, means that the statute cannot be applied 
to anyone.196 Thus, the precedential effect of an inseverability ruling is not 
limited to persons who have suffered a similar wrong—an injury from the 
unconstitutional part of the statute—and instead extends to anyone who is 
injured by any part of the statute. 
Consideration of both the as-applied and overbreadth postures 
confirms that severability should not be understood as “remedial.” When 
Speaker argues in the as-applied posture that the protest ban in § 2 of the 
Yellowstone Act is unconstitutional and inseverable from the motor vehicle 
ban in § 1, he is making the same argument that Biker makes in the 
overbreadth posture. But the severability question is not “remedial” for 
Biker. It does not determine how to redress a wrong that Biker has suffered. 
It instead determines whether Biker has suffered a wrong at all, which 
makes it a substantive doctrine. In other words, it determines whether the 
motor vehicle ban is unlawful, not how to remedy that problem if it is 
unlawful. The same was true, for example, when severability arose in the 
overbreadth posture in Alaska Airlines. The severability issue in that case 
determined whether the provisions that injured the plaintiffs were lawful, 
not how to remedy an injury from the unconstitutional legislative veto 
provision.197 
3. Severability Is Still a Claim if It Affects the Scope of  
the Remedy.—So there are good reasons not to view severability 
as a remedial question, and instead to view it as a substantive claim when it 
arises in the as-applied posture. But even if severability could be 
understood to be “remedial” in the sense that it affects the scope of the 
remedy, that still would not change the application of the claim-specific 
approach to standing. In fact, decisions such as Lewis and Moose Lodge 
make clear that the claim-specific approach limits the scope of the remedy. 
In Lewis, the Supreme Court held that the district court had exceeded 
its authority under Article III by issuing an injunction that attempted to 
remedy violations of the law that had not injured the plaintiffs.198 The 
 
195 Cf. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006) (rejecting rule that all 
plaintiffs who prove patent infringement are entitled to a permanent injunction because the application 
of equitable considerations can vary depending on the infringement at issue); id. at 396–97 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (observing that, in deciding whether to grant an injunction based on past practice, 
“courts must determine whether past practice fits the circumstances of the cases before them”). 
196 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 32, at 1331–32. 
197 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 683 (1987). 
198 See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358, 360 (1996). 
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plaintiffs had standing only to challenge the failure to provide special 
services to illiterate inmates, the Court held, and the district court therefore 
lacked constitutional authority to remedy other types of inadequacies in 
prison law libraries.199 In other words, the court could not address 
constitutional problems that had not injured the plaintiffs simply by 
characterizing its consideration of those problems as determining the scope 
of its remedy. Similarly, in Moose Lodge, the Court held that the remedy 
entered by the district court was too broad because it was directed to both 
the defendant club’s membership policy and its guest-service policy, even 
though the plaintiff had standing to challenge only the guest-service 
policy.200 
This reasoning applies equally to the question of severability in the as-
applied posture. If Speaker argues that the protest ban in the Yellowstone 
Act is unconstitutional and that the motor vehicle ban is invalid on 
inseverability grounds, he is seeking a remedy that covers both the protest 
ban and the motor vehicle ban—for example, a declaratory judgment that 
both are invalid. To support the full breadth of that remedy, Lewis makes 
clear that Speaker would be required to have Article III standing to 
challenge the motor vehicle ban under the claim-specific standing theory.201 
Lewis and its discussion of the scope of the remedy also confirm that a 
plaintiff in the overbreadth posture would not face an Article III standing 
problem. If Biker argues that the motor vehicle ban is unlawful because the 
protest ban is unconstitutional and inseverable, the remedy need only cover 
the motor vehicle ban—for example, a declaratory judgment that the motor 
vehicle ban is invalid. Although the court’s ruling would establish that the 
protest ban is unconstitutional as a matter of precedent, the remedy need 
not say anything about the protest ban in Biker’s case. Thus, Lewis would 
not require Biker to have Article III standing with respect to the protest 
ban. 
In sum, even to the extent that severability can be understood as a 
remedial inquiry, the claim-specific approach to standing would still limit 
the Article III power of courts to decide severability questions in the as-
applied posture. It would not, however, limit their power to decide 
severability questions in the overbreadth posture. 
4. Application to Cases.—This section applies the preceding analysis 
to three paradigmatic Supreme Court decisions that involved questions of 
severability—Northern Pipeline, Alaska Airlines, and NFIB. It concludes 
that, under the claim-specific approach to standing, the Court could not 
 
199 See id. at 357–58. 
200 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 168, 170–71 (1972). 
201 See 518 U.S. at 357 (“The remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced 
the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.”). 
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have reached the severability question in Northern Pipeline; that it could 
have reached the severability question in Alaska Airlines; and that it could 
have reached the severability question in NFIB, albeit for reasons that went 
unstated by the Court. This analysis confirms that the claim-specific 
approach would change the results of actual cases in which severability is 
at issue. And although there are also cases in which the result would not 
change, the severability rulings in those cases could no longer be explained 
as rulings in the as-applied posture. Instead, they would need to be viewed 
as rulings in the overbreadth posture. 
In Northern Pipeline, the Court held that § 1471(b) was 
unconstitutional as applied to Northern’s contract claims against Marathon, 
and that this application was inseverable from the other applications of the 
statute.202 Under the claim-specific standing theory, the Court could not 
have reached that severability question because Marathon did not have 
Article III standing to raise it. The severability question arose in the as-
applied posture—Marathon argued that the statute was unconstitutional as 
applied to it, and that the other applications of the statute were invalid on 
inseverability grounds. But Marathon was not injured by the other 
applications of the statute, so the Court would have lacked power to rule on 
severability. 
The claim-specific theory would have required the Court in Northern 
Pipeline to defer any ruling on severability until a case arose that presented 
the severability issue in the overbreadth posture. For example, a party in a 
subsequent case could have been sued on a federal claim that arose under 
the bankruptcy code. That party could have argued that the application of 
§ 1471(b) to this federal claim was unlawful because the statute was 
unconstitutional as applied to state law contract claims, and because the 
applications of the statute were inseverable. Until such a case arose, 
however, the severability question would have gone unanswered, and it 
would have remained unclear whether § 1471(b) was wholly invalid or 
only partially invalid. 
In Alaska Airlines, in contrast, the outcome would have been the same 
under the claim-specific approach to standing. The challenge in that case 
arose in the overbreadth posture: The plaintiff airlines argued that the 
provisions of the statute that injured them were invalid because the 
legislative veto provision was both unconstitutional and inseverable.203 The 
claim-specific theory does not limit plaintiffs’ Article III standing to raise 
inseverability claims in this posture, so the Court still would have been 
correct to rule on severability. 
 
202 See 458 U.S. 50, 87 n.40 (1982) (plurality opinion); id. at 91–92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
203 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 680, 683 (1987). 
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In NFIB, the Court also could have ruled on severability under the 
claim-specific approach to standing, albeit not for the reasons that it 
appears to have assumed. After the Court held that the Medicaid expansion 
in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was unconstitutional as applied to the 
plaintiff States, it rejected the States’ argument that the Medicaid expansion 
was inseverable without mentioning standing.204 From the States’ vantage 
point, this inseverability claim arose in the as-applied posture. The States 
therefore could not have raised inseverability under the claim-specific 
approach unless they had standing to challenge some other provision of the 
statute. Thus, if the States had been the only plaintiffs, the claim-specific 
theory might have precluded a severability ruling.205 
The States, however, were not the only plaintiffs in NFIB. There were 
also private plaintiffs who were injured by the ACA’s individual mandate, 
which required them to purchase health insurance or pay a penalty.206 Under 
the claim-specific approach, these private plaintiffs had Article III standing 
to raise the severability question in the overbreadth posture by arguing that, 
even if the individual mandate was constitutional, it was still unlawful 
because the Medicaid expansion was unconstitutional and inseverable from 
the remainder of the ACA.207 Because the severability issue determined the 
validity of the individual mandate, and because the private plaintiffs had 
standing to challenge the individual mandate, the Court had power under 
Article III to reach severability. 
To be sure, the Court did not frame its analysis in these terms. The 
Justices in the majority did not even address standing for the severability 
question.208 These Justices likely concluded that a standing analysis was 
unnecessary under established practice because the severability question 
arose in the as-applied posture with respect to the States. And the Justices 
in dissent explicitly argued that a standing analysis was not required in the 
as-applied posture.209 Thus, none of the Justices attempted to apply the 
 
204 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607–08 (2012) (plurality opinion); id. at 2630, 2642 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
205 In the decision from which NFIB arose, the Eleventh Circuit described the question of whether 
the States had standing to challenge the individual mandate as “interesting and difficult,” and declined 
to decide that question because it was immaterial to the outcome. Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2011). 
206 See id. at 1244 (concluding that it was “beyond dispute” that the private plaintiffs had standing 
to challenge the individual mandate). The Supreme Court did not question this conclusion in NFIB. 
207 Cf. Reply Brief for Private Petitioners on Severability at 3–4, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (Nos. 11-
393 & 11-400), 2012 WL 864595, at *3–4 (arguing that the government’s standing argument was 
inapposite because there were multiple plaintiffs with multiple injuries in the case, although not raising 
precisely this form of the severability argument). 
208 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607–08 (plurality opinion); id. at 2630, 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring 
in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
209 See id. at 2671 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
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claim-specific approach to the severability issue. Yet the Court still 
happened to reach a result that was consistent with the claim-specific 
analysis. 
So the claim-specific approach to standing would change the result in 
cases like Northern Pipeline, but not in cases like NFIB. To understand the 
practical impact of the claim-specific approach, therefore, it would help to 
know whether most cases are like Northern Pipeline or like NFIB. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to answer that question with a high degree of 
accuracy. In past decisions in which it ruled on severability, the Court did 
not consider the claim-specific approach to standing. It simply assumed 
that a severability ruling was consistent with Article III, and did not address 
whether any of the plaintiffs had standing to raise the severability question. 
Any analysis of whether these plaintiffs had standing for severability is 
therefore subject to a substantial amount of uncertainty—particularly given 
the acknowledged vagaries of standing doctrine.210 
Nevertheless, based on my review of the Court’s severability decisions 
over the past four decades, and the Court’s description of the parties and 
the facts in these decisions, it appears that most decisions in which the 
Court has expressly decided severability questions are similar to NFIB. 
That is, in most of these cases, at least one plaintiff seemed to have 
standing to raise an inseverability argument in the overbreadth posture—
either because the plaintiff raising the constitutional claim was injured by 
multiple statutory provisions, or because there were multiple plaintiffs who 
were injured by different provisions.211 This analysis suggests that many 
results would not change under the claim-specific approach. 
Even so, there is an identifiable universe of cases in which the 
outcome would change under the claim-specific approach to standing. In 
these cases, the Court decided a severability question that arose in the as-
applied posture. And although the Court did not address standing, it is 
evident from the Court’s description of the facts and the parties that no 
 
210 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (“[T]he concept of ‘Art. III standing’ has not been defined with complete 
consistency in all of the various cases decided by this Court which have discussed it . . . .”). 
211 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508–10, 513–
14 (2010) (plaintiffs appeared to be injured by both the provisions protecting Board members from 
removal and the provisions authorizing the Board to conduct investigations, and therefore had standing 
to argue that the provisions were inseverable); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 
320, 324–25 (2006) (plaintiffs appeared to be injured by multiple parts of an abortion statute, and 
therefore had standing to raise severability); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 267–68 (2005) 
(there were two defendants challenging the statute, Booker and Fanfan, and the severability question 
appeared to make a difference as to how each defendant’s case would proceed on remand, and thus they 
had standing to argue that the provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act were inseverable); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 18687 (1992) (New York appeared to have standing to challenge separate 
provisions of a federal statute governing the disposal of radioactive waste). 
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plaintiff would have had Article III standing to raise severability under the 
claim-specific approach. Within the past few decades, these decisions 
include Northern Pipeline,212 Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.,213 and Reno 
v. ACLU.214 There are undoubtedly more such decisions from prior years 
given that the Court has been deciding severability questions since the late 
nineteenth century,215 but has not previously applied a claim-specific 
standing analysis.216 Lower courts too have often addressed severability 
questions in the as-applied posture when it was evident that standing was 
lacking.217 The claim-specific approach to standing would therefore disrupt 
the status quo on severability by changing the disposition in these types of 
cases. 
Moreover, even in cases in which the outcome would be the same 
under the claim-specific approach, the severability ruling would generally 
need to be understood as a ruling in the overbreadth posture, rather than the 
as-applied posture. That change in rationale would have real effects. If the 
as-applied posture were no longer an outlet for severability rulings, more 
severability questions would be channeled into the overbreadth posture. 
Rather than being a rarity, claims in this posture would become the norm. 
Cases like Alaska Airlines would become more common, and plaintiffs 
would increasingly argue that parts of statutes that do not apply to them are 
 
212 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
213 472 U.S. 491 (1985). In Brockett, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in invalidating an 
obscenity statute in its entirety on overbreadth grounds. See id. at 507. The Court reasoned that the 
statute was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs, who intended to engage only in nonobscene, 
protected speech, and it was therefore unnecessary to resort to overbreadth doctrine and facially 
invalidate the statute. See id. at 494, 504. The Court nevertheless proceeded to hold that the application 
of the statute to the plaintiffs was severable from the remaining applications to obscene speech. See id. 
at 506–07. Because those remaining applications did not appear to injure the plaintiffs, see id. at 494, 
the plaintiffs lacked standing to raise the severability question. 
214 521 U.S. 844 (1997). In Reno, the Court addressed, among other things, the constitutionality of 
47 U.S.C. § 223(a), which applied to “obscene or indecent” communications, and held that the 
application of the statute to “indecent” communications was unconstitutional. See id. at 883. Although 
the Court noted that the plaintiffs had not challenged the statute as applied to obscene communications, 
the Court held that the term “indecent” was severable from the remainder of the provision. See id. This 
severability question did not appear to affect any part of the statute that injured the plaintiffs. 
215 See Nagle, supra note 71, at 214. 
216 Cf., e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 241–45 (1929) (ruling that statute was 
inseverable after holding that it was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs, without conducting a 
separate standing analysis for the severability question); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 70–71 (1922) 
(ruling that statute was inseverable in part and severable in part without conducting standing analysis). 
217 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Tex., Inc. v. Abbott, 647 F.3d 202, 211, 215 (5th Cir. 
2011) (ruling on severability even though the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the affected 
provisions); W. States Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 238 F.3d 1090, 1096–98 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a 
statute was inseverable without suggesting that the affected provisions injured the plaintiffs); Bd. of 
Natural Res. v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 948 (9th Cir. 1993) (considering severability of statutory 
provisions that regulated federal lands and did not appear to affect the state plaintiffs). 
109:285 (2015) Supplemental Standing for Severability 
327 
unconstitutional and inseverable. It would also be more difficult for courts 
to use prudential, third-party standing principles to limit the overbreadth 
posture. In light of the constitutional restraints on the as-applied posture, 
applying prudential restraints in the overbreadth posture would severely 
diminish courts’ ability to make severability rulings at all. 
All of this would constitute a significant break from past practice. One 
might therefore expect that there should be a good reason for making the 
change. As the next section explains, however, no such reason exists. 
B. Claim-Specific Standing for Severability Would Undermine the 
Purposes of Standing Doctrine 
In addition to its purported consistency with existing practice, the 
Supreme Court has justified the claim-specific theory on the ground that it 
reinforces the central purposes of standing doctrine—protecting the 
separation of powers and promoting sound judicial decisions. Although that 
justification is plausible in many cases, it fails when the claim-specific 
approach is applied to severability questions. 
1. Separation of Powers.—Under the claim-specific standing theory, 
Article III standing principles would limit rulings on severability in the as-
applied posture. That means courts would sometimes lack power to decide 
severability questions after ruling that part of a statute is unconstitutional. 
But a ruling on severability gives effect to the separation of powers. When 
a court finds that part of a statute is unconstitutional, severability doctrine 
permits the court to invalidate the statute to the extent that Congress would 
have wanted.218 If a court cannot rule on severability, it can be forced to 
leave in place a new version of the statute that Congress never would have 
enacted. Preventing the court from deciding severability therefore harms 
the separation of powers, rather than preserving it 
For example, consider Northern Pipeline. In that case, the Court 
concluded that granting jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts over state law 
contract claims was unconstitutional, and that the entire jurisdictional 
provision should be invalidated on inseverability grounds.219 That 
inseverability ruling was faithful to the separation of powers because it 
adhered to Congress’s intent to have the statue stand or fall as a whole. 
Under the claim-specific approach to standing, in contrast, the Court could 
not have reached the severability issue, and thus could not have invalidated 
the entire statute. That disposition would have left the bankruptcy court’s 
 
218 See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330–31 (2006). 
219 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 n.40 (1982) (plurality 
opinion); id. at 91–92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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jurisdiction partially intact—a result that the Court found Congress never 
would have wanted. 
It is true that the claim-specific approach to standing permits 
severability rulings to be made in the overbreadth posture. It thus does not 
completely eliminate courts’ power to make severability rulings that are 
necessary to protect the separation of powers. In Northern Pipeline, for 
example, a severability ruling could have been made in a subsequent case. 
But there are some circumstances in which that is not true. Sometimes, 
even when the overbreadth posture is taken into account, no party would 
ever have Article III standing to challenge a statutory provision. In those 
cases, the claim-specific approach would never permit the separation of 
powers to be given effect through a severability ruling. 
Consider, for example, § 3 of our hypothetical Yellowstone Act, 
which appropriates funds to the National Park Service so that it can report 
to Congress on the effects of the motor vehicle and protest bans.220 This 
spending provision does not injure anyone—at least not in a way that gives 
rise to standing under current doctrine.221 That means no plaintiff would 
have standing to argue that the appropriation of funds in § 3 is invalid on 
inseverability grounds. As a result, if a court struck down both the motor 
vehicle ban and the protest ban, it would be required to leave § 3 in place—
even though Congress undoubtedly would not have appropriated funds so 
that the National Park Service could report on the effects of statutory 
provisions that have been invalidated. In fact, even if Congress included an 
inseverability clause in the Yellowstone Act providing that the entire 
statute should stand or fall together, a court would still lack constitutional 
power under the claim-specific approach to give effect to that clause and 
invalidate § 3. 
Moreover, even when a severability question could be decided in the 
overbreadth posture in a later case, the failure to rule on severability in the 
same case as a constitutional ruling would still harm the separation of 
powers. It could require the court to leave intact, even if only temporarily, a 
new version of the statute that Congress would not have enacted. At 
minimum, it would create uncertainty regarding the state of the law, which 
would make Congress’s work more difficult. Because it would not know 
whether the rest of the statute will be found invalid, Congress would not 
know whether a legislative solution is necessary. In contrast, when a court 
immediately rules on severability in the as-applied posture, it provides a 
definitive decision that Congress can either leave in place or overturn. 
 
220 See supra Part I.B. 
221 See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343 (2006) (explaining that plaintiffs 
generally lack standing to challenge federal expenditures because any injury is insufficiently 
particularized). 
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Allowing rulings on severability in the overbreadth posture therefore would 
not solve the separation of powers problems produced by the claim-specific 
approach to standing. 
In fact, this reliance on the overbreadth posture for rulings on 
severability would ultimately make things worse from the perspective of 
standing doctrine. At its core, standing principles are meant to serve the 
separation of powers by preventing constitutional rulings regarding 
government conduct that does not injure the plaintiff.222 Because it would 
channel inseverability claims into the overbreadth posture, however, the 
claim-specific approach would fail to advance that purpose. Plaintiffs 
injured by one part of a statute would have an increasingly strong incentive 
to seek out a constitutional flaw in a different part of the statute that has no 
effect on them, and argue that the other part of the statute is 
unconstitutional and inseverable.223 Courts would therefore be faced with 
far more constitutional questions in the overbreadth posture, which would 
produce more conflict between the branches. 
A court need not, of course, always reach the merits of a constitutional 
claim in the overbreadth posture. In this posture, the court generally should 
rule on severability first because, if the statute is severable, the 
constitutional question is moot. But that is a prudential exercise of 
constitutional avoidance,224 not an Article III limitation. The claim-specific 
approach would do nothing to limit the power of a court to decide a 
constitutional question in the overbreadth posture. 
In the end, therefore, the effect of the claim-specific approach in 
statutory cases would be to impose Article III standing limitations on 
severability rulings, but not constitutional rulings. That is the opposite of 
what one would expect under bedrock principles of standing law. Because 
Congress can overturn severability rulings but not constitutional rulings,225 
a constitutional ruling is far more disruptive to the separation of powers 
than a severability ruling. Indeed, that is why the Court has described its 
standing inquiry as “especially rigorous” when a plaintiff challenges the 
constitutionality of a federal statute.226 From the perspective of standing, 
therefore, it is better to have parties argue about the severability of 
provisions that do not apply to them than to argue about the 
 
222 See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013). 
223 See, e.g., Dorsey, supra note 71, at 889 (suggesting a hypothetical in which a plaintiff whose 
assets are seized pursuant to one provision argues that an unrelated provision is unconstitutional and 
inseverable); Walsh, supra note 22, at 77 (“If a party affected by any [provision of a statute] could gain 
standing by pointing to a constitutional defect in any other provision . . . , then standing doctrine would 
be reduced to a sport for clever counsel.”). 
224 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014) (describing avoidance canon). 
225 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265 (2005). 
226 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997)). 
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constitutionality of provisions that do not apply to them. Claim-specific 
standing would invert that principle. 
Even the current members of the Supreme Court who are most 
committed to standing doctrine—i.e., the conservative Justices227—have 
recognized that limiting severability rulings in the as-applied posture would 
harm the separation of powers. In NFIB, the dissent argued that it would be 
“destructive of sound government” to use standing doctrine to prohibit a 
severability ruling.228 If a court could not reach severability when it ruled 
that a statute was partially unconstitutional, the dissent was concerned that 
it would be unclear which parts of the statute remain valid.229 The dissent 
also argued that this concern applied with particular force to a 
“multifaceted piece of legislation” such as the ACA, because “[i]t would 
take years, perhaps decades, for each of its provisions to be adjudicated 
separately—and for some of them (those simply expending federal funds) 
no one may have separate standing.”230 
2. Sound Decisionmaking.—The claim-specific approach to standing 
would therefore harm the separation of powers when applied to severability 
questions. But that approach might still be thought to support standing 
doctrine’s other central purpose—promoting sound judicial decisions. After 
all, it would prevent courts from ruling on severability questions that 
concern the validity of statutory provisions that do not injure the plaintiff. It 
would therefore seem to limit courts to concrete, adverse disputes about 
severability. For several reasons, however, applying the claim-specific 
theory to severability could easily undermine the interest in sound 
decisionmaking. At minimum, the claim-specific approach would not 
sufficiently advance the interest in accurate judicial decisions to overcome 
the damage that it would do the separation of powers. 
As an initial matter, it is doubtful that the injury in fact requirement 
would improve the quality of severability arguments and, in turn, the 
quality of severability rulings. Scholars have long argued that an injury in 
fact does not correlate with good advocacy.231 Even assuming that standing 
doctrine nevertheless promotes good advocacy in some contexts, it is 
particularly unlikely to do so for severability. The claim-specific approach 
would limit severability rulings in the as-applied posture and channel them 
into the overbreadth posture. But severability arises in the as-applied 
 
227 See Elliott, supra note 28, at 587. 
228 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2671 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
229 Id. 
230 Id.; cf. Fallon, supra note 35, at 964 (explaining that the Court’s function is sometimes to 
resolve uncertainty); Gans, supra note 94, at 683 (analyzing the practical costs when the effects of 
Court’s ruling are not immediately clear). 
231 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 11, at 474 & n.77. 
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posture only if the plaintiff has succeeded on a constitutional claim—which 
suggests that the plaintiff is a strong advocate who would make a robust 
presentation on severability. In the overbreadth posture, in contrast, the 
court can rule on severability before ruling on the plaintiff’s constitutional 
claim, so there is no assurance that the plaintiff is a strong advocate. 
Moreover, severability is a purely legal question that turns primarily 
on Congress’s intent.232 A court’s decision on the issue of severability is 
therefore unlikely to be aided by the development of a concrete record in a 
case in which the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact. The facts of the 
case are unlikely to inform the decision on severability at all. The injury in 
fact requirement therefore seems unlikely to enhance the quality of 
decisionmaking on severability. 
In any event, even if the claim-specific approach could be understood 
to promote the interest in sound decisionmaking on severability, it would 
undermine that interest for constitutional questions. The claim-specific 
approach would allow plaintiffs to raise claims in the overbreadth posture, 
and therefore permit highly abstract constitutional challenges to statutory 
provisions that do not apply to the plaintiffs. Again, this asymmetry would 
turn core principles of standing doctrine on their head. Standing is most 
concerned with promoting sound decisions on constitutional questions233—
particularly because Congress can revisit a court’s erroneous severability 
(or other statutory) rulings, but not its erroneous constitutional rulings. 
 
 * * * 
 
In sum, the claim-specific approach to standing is inconsistent with 
current practice on severability and would interfere with the purposes of 
standing doctrine—particularly in cases in which a severability ruling in 
the as-applied posture is necessary to preserve the separation of powers. 
The next Part argues that there is a better alternative that both explains 
existing practice and advances the aims of standing doctrine in the 
severability context—supplemental standing. 
IV. SUPPLEMENTAL STANDING 
The Supreme Court has justified its adoption of a claim-specific 
approach to standing—and its rejection of supplemental standing—on the 
ground that claim-specific standing is consistent with existing practice and 
serves the purposes of standing doctrine. As shown in the preceding Part, 
that justification fails in cases involving severability. In fact, established 
 
232 See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329–31 (2006). 
233 Cf. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013). 
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practice for severability is best understood as a form of supplemental 
standing. This Part explains why a supplemental-standing approach both 
conforms to existing severability doctrine and better serves the functions of 
standing doctrine. 
The problems with the claim-specific theory, however, are not limited 
to severability. Existing practice in additional cases already reflects a 
supplemental-standing approach. And shifting to a supplemental-standing 
approach appears to be warranted in others. This Part therefore concludes 
by considering how to develop a more general theory of supplemental 
standing. 
A. Supplemental Standing for Severability 
1. Supplemental Standing Explains Practice on Severability.—As 
explained in Part II.A, the concept of supplemental standing does not 
require plaintiffs to have standing for every claim that they raise. Rather, a 
plaintiff can have standing for some claims and supplemental standing for 
related claims. Standing is still required for an Article III “case” to exist, 
but it does not define the outer boundaries of such a case. Some other 
criterion determines which claims are sufficiently related to fall within the 
same Article III case. 
Established practice on severability is consistent with a form of 
supplemental standing that always grants courts Article III power to rule on 
severability in the as-applied posture. In other words, existing practice is 
explained by a supplemental-standing approach that treats constitutional 
challenges to statutes and severability claims as sufficiently related to fall 
within a single Article III case. Thus, when a plaintiff has standing to 
challenge a statute on constitutional grounds, the plaintiff has supplemental 
standing to raise a severability claim. 
To illustrate, suppose again that Speaker challenges the protest ban in 
§ 2 of the Yellowstone Act234 as unconstitutional, and argues that the 
remainder of the statute is invalid because the protest ban is inseverable. 
Under the supplemental-standing approach described here, Speaker still 
needs standing for at least one claim to have an Article III case in the first 
place—which he does because he is injured by the protest ban. But 
standing requirements do not define the limits of that case. Thus, even 
though Speaker is not injured by the rest of the statute, his inseverability 
argument is not excluded on standing grounds. Rather, Speaker has 
supplemental standing for his inseverability claim, and that claim is part of 
the same Article III case as his constitutional claim. 
 
234 See supra Part I.B. 
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This supplemental-standing approach explains established 
understandings of when severability can be decided. Consistent with 
existing practice, supplemental standing always grants a court the power to 
rule on severability in the as-applied posture after ruling in the plaintiff’s 
favor on a constitutional claim.235 For example, the Court’s decision in 
Northern Pipeline can be understood as resting on the theory of 
supplemental standing. After Marathon succeeded on its argument that 
§ 1471(b) was unconstitutional as applied to Northern’s contract claims 
against it, Marathon had supplemental standing to argue that the statute’s 
applications to other types of claims were invalid on inseverability grounds. 
The Court properly accepted that inseverability argument, even though 
Marathon lacked standing to challenge the statute’s other applications. 
Similarly, in NFIB, the plaintiff States had standing to challenge the 
Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) expansion of the Medicaid program, and 
supplemental standing to argue that the remainder of the ACA should be 
invalidated on inseverability grounds. The Court correctly considered this 
inseverability argument under the theory of supplemental standing. 
The supplemental-standing approach is also consistent with the 
principle that courts are not required to rule on severability arguments in 
the as-applied posture. Supplemental standing is about Article III power, 
not how it should be exercised. Although it grants courts the constitutional 
authority to rule on severability claims, it does not call into question the 
types of prudential, third-party standing limitations that courts have used to 
avoid immediate rulings on severability.236 For example, in Printz, the 
Supreme Court had constitutional authority under a supplemental-standing 
theory to decide the question of severability in the as-applied posture, but 
was free to limit the exercise of that authority based on prudential 
considerations.237 
In addition, supplemental standing is consistent with practice in the 
overbreadth posture. The prevailing view among courts and scholars is that 
a plaintiff has Article III standing for a claim in the overbreadth posture.238 
For example, in Alaska Airlines, the plaintiffs had standing to argue that the 
legislative veto was unconstitutional and inseverable from the provisions 
that injured them. That view is consistent even with claim-specific 
standing,239 and is therefore consistent with the more permissive 
supplemental-standing approach as well. In other words, while 
supplemental standing supports the power to rule on severability in the as-
 
235 See supra Part I.C.1. 
236 See supra Part I.C.1. 
237 See supra Part I.C.1; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
238 See supra Part I.C.2. 
239 See supra Parts III.A.1, 4. 
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applied posture, it does not limit the power to rule on severability in the 
overbreadth posture. Supplemental standing would not, however, require 
severability rulings in decisions such as NFIB to be reformulated as rulings 
in the overbreadth posture, as the claim-specific approach would.240 
2. Supplemental Standing for Severability Advances the Purposes of 
Standing Doctrine.—The supplemental-standing approach to 
severability also better serves the functions of standing doctrine—
protecting the separation of powers and promoting sound decisions—than 
the claim-specific approach. This conclusion follows from the analysis in 
Part III.B, which showed that the claim-specific approach would undermine 
the aims of standing law in the severability context by preventing 
severability rulings in the as-applied posture. Supplemental standing for 
severability permits those rulings, and therefore advances the purposes of 
standing doctrine for all of the same reasons that the claim-specific 
approach for severability would not. 
In particular, unlike claim-specific standing, the supplemental-
standing approach always authorizes courts to make severability rulings 
that are necessary to preserve the separation of powers. That eliminates the 
problems that would arise if, after ruling in the plaintiff’s favor on a 
constitutional challenge to a statute, the court were required to leave in 
place a revised statute that Congress never would have enacted. It also 
means that a court would not be required to leave the state of the law 
uncertain by deferring a ruling on severability to a later case. Congress 
would know immediately whether a legislative fix is required. 
That said, the supplemental-standing theory would still allow courts to 
refrain from deciding severability questions if there were good prudential 
reasons to do so.241 For example, the parties may fail to raise a severability 
dispute, or they may poorly frame the issue and thus fail to help the court 
reach a sound decision. Supplemental standing would allow courts to 
balance the harms and benefits of deferring a ruling on severability. And 
because the reasons for addressing or declining to address severability in 
particular cases would be prudential, rather than constitutional, they would 
be subject to democratic controls by Congress.242 
The supplemental-standing approach to severability also avoids the 
counterintuitive asymmetry created by the claim-specific approach between 
the as-applied posture and the overbreadth posture. Under supplemental 
standing, Article III permits severability rulings in both postures, and both 
postures are subject to prudential standing limitations. Thus, the 
 
240 See supra Part III.A.4. 
241 See supra Part I.C.1. 
242 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997). 
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supplemental-standing approach does not invert principles of separation of 
powers by making it easier to decide a constitutional question in the 
overbreadth posture than to decide a severability question in the as-applied 
posture. 
In theory, another alternative for eliminating this asymmetry would be 
to double down on claim-specific standing and limit Article III standing in 
the overbreadth posture as well. One way to achieve that result would be to 
permit a severability ruling only when a single plaintiff is injured by 
multiple parts of a statute, and that plaintiff therefore has standing for both 
the constitutional claim and the inseverability claim. But this approach 
would, like the existing claim-specific approach, interfere with the 
separation of powers by preventing numerous severability rulings in the as-
applied posture that are necessary to give effect to Congress’s intent. For 
example, a court might never be able to rule on the validity of provisions of 
a complex statute like the ACA that do not directly injure anyone, even if it 
were clear that Congress would not have enacted those provisions on their 
own.243 It would also be difficult to apply Article III standing limitations to 
severability questions in the overbreadth posture without casting doubt on 
well-established decisions and scholarship on First Amendment 
overbreadth doctrine.244 
Ultimately, therefore, the concept of supplemental standing is 
preferable to the claim-specific approach in the severability context. 
Supplemental standing explains established practice on severability and is 
more faithful to the purposes of standing doctrine. The Court was therefore 
incorrect in Cuno to assert that the claim-specific approach is always 
consistent with existing practice and always furthers the aims of standing 
law. And the Court erred, at least as a matter of principle, in dismissing 
supplemental standing as a categorical matter. 
B. Toward a General Theory of Supplemental Standing 
The preceding discussion has focused on the problems that arise when 
the claim-specific approach to standing is applied to severability, and the 
benefits of a theory that grants supplemental standing for severability 
claims. But does supplemental standing fit into the law more generally, or 
is severability merely an isolated case in which the claim-specific theory of 
standing breaks down? If the problems in the severability context were sui 
generis, it might make sense for purposes of uniformity and simplicity to 
accept those problems and apply the claim-specific theory across the board, 
rather than developing a new theory of supplemental standing. As this 
section explains, however, severability is not the only context in which 
 
243 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2671 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
244 See supra Part III.A.1. 
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established practice is inconsistent with the claim-specific approach to 
standing. In at least two other contexts, existing practice already appears to 
reflect a supplemental-standing approach. That means there is a broader 
problem with claim-specific standing, and suggests that there are additional 
contexts in which supplemental standing is warranted. 
1. Supplemental Standing Explains Practice in Other Contexts.—In 
addition to cases involving severability, the Supreme Court has effectively 
adopted a supplemental-standing approach in cases involving facial 
challenges to statutes and cases involving multiple plaintiffs raising the 
same claim. And it has done so with good reason. 
a. Facial challenges.—Existing practice for facial challenges 
can be explained by supplemental standing, but not the claim-specific 
approach to standing. When a court invalidates a statute pursuant to a facial 
challenge, it rules that the statute cannot be applied to anyone.245 Courts 
therefore effectively grant plaintiffs raising facial challenges supplemental 
standing to assert the claims of other potential plaintiffs. 
Take, for example, the Court’s recent decision in United States v. 
Windsor.246 The plaintiff in that case argued that § 3 of the Defense of 
Marriage Act, which defined “marriage” for purposes of federal law, was 
unconstitutional as applied to same-sex marriages.247 Under the claim-
specific approach, the Court could have ruled only on the application of the 
statute that the plaintiff had standing to challenge—its application to same-
sex marriages. Yet under current practice, the effect of the Court’s ruling 
was to strike down § 3 on its face because the Court held it was enacted 
pursuant to an improper legislative purpose.248 The Court thus effectively 
granted the plaintiff supplemental standing to challenge the statute’s 
application to other marriages. 
Similarly, in Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court held that a 
federal statute that regulated election-related expenditures by corporations 
 
245 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 32, at 1326. Professor Fallon has explained that, some doctrinal 
tests, such as “suspect-content” tests, result in facial invalidation because they preclude any subsequent 
severance of statutory applications. Id. at 1346. But other doctrinal tests, such as tests that turn on 
improper legislative purpose, result in facial invalidation because they mark every application of the 
statute as unconstitutional. See id. at 1345. The conflict between the claim-specific theory of standing 
and existing practice on facial challenges therefore overlaps with, but is not limited to, the conflict 
between the claim-specific theory and existing practice on severability. 
246 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
247 See id. at 2683. 
248 See id. at 2696 (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose 
and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in 
personhood and dignity.”); see also Fallon, supra note 32, at 1345 (explaining that “[p]urpose tests” 
result in facial invalidation). 
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violated the First Amendment.249 The plaintiff in Citizens United was 
engaging in—or at least was assumed to be engaging in—protected speech, 
and therefore would have had standing under the claim-specific approach 
to challenge only the application of the statute to protected speech.250 But 
the Court made clear that it was invalidating the statute as a facial matter.251 
It therefore implicitly granted the plaintiff supplemental standing to 
challenge the statute’s application to all speech, including unprotected 
speech. 
Furthermore, as in the severability context, established practice for 
facial challenges is faithful to the purposes of standing doctrine, whereas 
the claim-specific approach would undermine those purposes. Limiting a 
court’s power to decide a facial challenge on standing grounds could overly 
burden the court’s exercise of judicial review and its ability to make clear 
what the law is.252 It could also lead to excessive interbranch conflict by 
requiring courts to adjudicate the constitutionality of a statute repeatedly on 
an application-by-application basis over time.253 The existing supplemental-
standing approach, in contrast, authorizes a court to decide a facial 
challenge in a manner that accounts for separation of powers concerns. As 
in the severability context, however, the courts and Congress can still 
impose prudential restraints on the exercise of this authority to decide facial 
challenges. 
b. Multiple plaintiffs.—The claim-specific approach to standing 
is also in serious tension with the oft-invoked rule that, if one plaintiff has 
standing for a claim, a court need not decide whether other plaintiffs in the 
case have standing for that claim.254 Contrary to the claim-specific 
approach, this practice does not require plaintiffs to have standing for every 
claim that they raise. It is therefore better understood as a form of 
supplemental standing. It interprets Article III broadly, to allow a case to 
include claims that some of the plaintiffs lack standing to assert, so long as 
another plaintiff has standing for those claims.255 
 
249 558 U.S. 310, 316 (2010). 
250 See id. at 336 (describing the speech at issue as “beyond all doubt protected”). 
251 See id. at 333 (finding it “necessary” to “consider the facial validity” the statute); see also 
Fallon, supra note 32, at 1346 (explaining that suspect-content tests of the sort applied in Citizens 
United result in facial invalidation). 
252 See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 333–34 (arguing that consideration of a facial challenge 
was necessary to resolve uncertainty); Fallon, supra note 35, at 964 (“It is the Court’s function 
sometimes to resolve uncertainty and to ensure effective constitutional implementation by [ruling] . . . 
that a particular statute is unconstitutional in all applications . . . .”). 
253 See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 334–36. 
254 See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263–64 & n.9 
(1977). 
255 See Steinman, supra note 34, at 741–48 (relying on supplemental jurisdiction principles to 
conclude that this rule is consistent with Article III). 
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This practice is also faithful to the underlying purposes of standing 
doctrine. If one plaintiff has standing to raise a claim, a ruling on the merits 
of that claim is, by definition, consistent with the separation of powers and 
sound decisionmaking interests of standing doctrine.256 To be sure, giving 
that ruling effect for other plaintiffs who have not been injured raises 
potential concerns.257 But those concerns can be addressed through 
prudential rules on joinder, class actions, and preclusion, rather than with 
an inflexible constitutional requirement. 
2. Supplemental Standing Appears to Be Justified in Additional 
Circumstances.—Current practice thus effectively adopts the 
concept of supplemental standing in at least three circumstances—
severability, facial challenges, and cases with multiple plaintiffs. These 
examples establish that the Supreme Court was incorrect in Cuno when it 
purported to reject supplemental standing on a categorical basis. They also 
suggest that there may be other contexts in which the law should recognize 
supplemental standing. And they ultimately suggest that we need a general 
theory of supplemental standing that can both explain current practice and 
identify other cases in which courts should grant supplemental standing. 
This Article does not attempt to develop a full-blown theory of when 
supplemental standing is warranted—a question that I intend to address in 
future work. But it is possible to sketch two ways to approach the subject. 
One potential approach would be category-based. This approach 
would treat the claim-specific standing requirement as a default rule, but 
recognize that there are exceptions for particular categories of cases and 
questions, such as severability. And it would identify those exceptions by 
looking for categories of cases or questions in which supplemental standing 
would be more faithful to the aims of standing doctrine, including the 
preservation of the separation of powers. 
Another potential approach would be standard-based. This approach 
would be similar to the Court’s approach to supplemental jurisdiction under 
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, which defines a constitutional 
case for jurisdictional purposes to include all claims that arise from a 
“common nucleus of operative fact.”258 A standard-based approach for 
supplemental standing could likewise rely on a generally applicable 
definition of a constitutional case for standing purposes. Courts could then 
 
256 See id. at 729 (observing that the rule for multiple plaintiffs “comports with a number of the 
basic values that are served by standing doctrine,” including the separation of powers and the interest in 
strong advocacy). 
257 See id. at 730–31 (observing that plaintiffs without standing can later seek to enforce a 
favorable judgment against the defendant). 
258 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). 
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apply that definition and grant supplemental standing on a case-by-case and 
claim-by-claim basis. 
My tentative view is that, in the standing context, a category-based 
approach is preferable. Experience has shown that the case-by-case 
application of a standard like the one from Gibbs can easily give rise to 
uncertainty and conflicting results.259 A category-based approach, in 
contrast, would be conducive to greater certainty and ease of application. 
The goal would be to identify discrete exceptions to the claim-specific 
standing requirement, so that courts could easily determine whether a given 
claim falls within one of the exceptions. 
Moreover, it is doubtful whether a single standard could both explain 
the current exceptions to the claim-specific standing approach and still 
preserve the aims of standing doctrine. For example, the Gibbs standard of 
a “common nucleus of operative fact” might not even solve the primary 
problem to which this Article is directed, which is to permit supplemental 
standing for severability claims. That standard looks to whether claims are 
factually related, but it is not clear that a constitutional claim and a 
severability claim are factually related in the sense of Gibbs. Scholars have 
proposed broader definitions of an Article III case for purposes of 
supplemental jurisdiction that might sweep in severability arguments—for 
example, a test that looks to whether claims are logically or legally 
related.260 But those tests could easily go too far if adopted for purposes of 
standing doctrine. They would grant courts extensive authority to decide 
claims that plaintiffs lack standing to raise, which would threaten the 
separation of powers for the reasons that the Court expressed in Cuno.261 
The category-based approach, in contrast, would permit supplemental 
standing only when it is consonant with the purposes of standing doctrine, 
and would still maintain general limitations on the power of the federal 
courts. 
All of this is not to say, however, that a category-based approach 
should be applied as a constitutional matter. Rather, such an approach 
could be applied as a statutory matter rather than as a matter of 
 
259 See, e.g., Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering “One Constitutional Case”: Procedural Rules and 
the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1399, 1448 (1983) 
(explaining that “[t]he phrase ‘common nucleus of operative fact’ is not self-defining” and that “courts 
and commentators have given the phrase several different interpretations”). 
260 See, e.g., Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute—A 
Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849, 908–11 (1992) (proposing a “logical 
relationship” test for supplemental jurisdiction); id. at 919–20 (addressing supplemental jurisdiction 
over legally related claims); see also William A. Fletcher, “Common Nucleus of Operative Fact” and 
Defensive Set-Off: Beyond the Gibbs Test, 74 IND. L.J. 171, 178 (1998); C. Douglas Floyd, Three Faces 
of Supplemental Jurisdiction After the Demise of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 60 FLA. L. REV. 277, 
282, 310–11 (2008); Matasar, supra note 259, at 1478–79. 
261 See 547 U.S. 332, 351–53 (2006). 
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constitutional law. In other words, Article III could be interpreted to permit 
supplemental standing for a broad range of claims—perhaps based on a 
logical-relationship or legal-relationship standard. And category-based 
limitations on supplemental standing could then be imposed by statute. 
This approach would have the virtue of making standing doctrine more 
democratic by shifting control to Congress and away from the courts. 
Congress could then make the same sort of choice for supplemental 
standing that it has made for supplemental jurisdiction262—whether to 
implement supplemental standing to the full extent allowed by the 
Constitution, or whether to impose additional limitations on the exercise of 
supplemental standing. 
So which additional categories of cases or questions might properly 
fall within a category-based approach to supplemental standing, either as a 
statutory or constitutional matter? I conclude by offering two potential 
examples. First, shifting to a supplemental-standing approach appears to be 
justified when a plaintiff seeks multiple remedies for the same 
constitutional violation, but does not have standing for all of those 
remedies. In other words, the Court erred in Lyons when it held that 
plaintiffs must have standing for every remedy they seek.263 That 
requirement is counterproductive from a separation of powers perspective 
because courts can often protect the separation of powers more effectively 
through flexible remedial doctrines, rather than blunt jurisdictional 
doctrines.264 Using standing requirements to limit the availability of 
particular remedies can also harm the separation of powers by narrowing 
Congress’s authority to decide whether to provide particular remedies for 
particular wrongs.265 A supplemental-standing approach for remedies could 
address these concerns and better preserve the separation of powers.266 
Second, and more tentatively, supplemental standing might be justified 
for constitutional claims that have important separation of powers 
implications, and that no plaintiff would ever have standing to raise. The 
Supreme Court has often held that standing doctrine requires dismissal of a 
claim even if no plaintiff would conceivably have standing to raise it.267 But 
scholars have recognized that the separation of powers and the law-
declaring function of the federal courts are diminished when an important 
 
262 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012) (authorizing supplemental jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by 
the Constitution in federal-question cases, but imposing limitations in diversity cases). 
263 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983). 
264 See Fallon, supra note 148, at 43–47. 
265 See id. at 30. 
266 See id. at 22 n.115 (appearing to endorse such an approach by suggesting that requests for 
different remedies arising from the same operative facts would be part of the same Article III case); 
Little, supra note 148, at 973 & n.182 (similar). 
267 See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1154 (2013). 
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constitutional question can never be decided.268 Supplemental standing 
could help to address this problem by providing a basis for ruling on these 
types of claims without doing away with standing doctrine altogether. 
For example, in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 
the Court confronted a question laden with separation of powers 
consequences: whether members of Congress could constitutionally hold 
memberships in the Armed Forces Reserves.269 The Court dismissed the 
case for lack of standing, even though it acknowledged that no plaintiff was 
likely to have standing to raise this question.270 A supplemental-standing 
approach could provide an avenue for a ruling on the merits of such a 
claim. Under this approach, if a plaintiff had standing for some other claim, 
and if the claims were sufficiently related to be joined in a single case 
under the rules of procedure, there would be no Article III impediment to a 
ruling on the constitutional claim. The basis for this approach would be that 
a ruling on the merits would ultimately be more faithful to the separation of 
powers than rejecting the claim as a threshold matter. But this approach 
would still impose principled limitations on the power of the federal courts 
to decide constitutional questions in the absence of standing. 
In any event, the aim of this Article is not to identify all of the 
problems with the claim-specific approach to standing, or to develop a 
complete theory of supplemental standing. Rather, it is to explain that the 
Court was wrong to adopt claim-specific standing as a categorical matter, 
and that the concept of supplemental standing should be adopted in at least 
some cases, including cases presenting severability questions. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the Supreme Court’s rationales for a 
claim-specific approach to standing cannot withstand scrutiny in the 
context of severability doctrine. Well-established practice for severability 
already reflects the concept of supplemental standing, and is justified in 
doing so. In fact, for these reasons, it is unclear whether any current 
members of the Court would dispute that some form of supplemental 
standing is necessary in severability cases. The Court did purport to rule 
out supplemental standing in Cuno. But all nine Justices appear to have 
embraced supplemental standing for severability, at least implicitly, in 
NFIB. The five Justices who held that the ACA was severable did not even 
mention the possibility that standing principles might limit their 
consideration of severability. Absent a supplemental-standing approach, 
however, at least some deliberation on standing would have been 
 
268 See, e.g., Re, supra note 11, at 1200 & n. 49, 1205. 
269 418 U.S. 208, 209 (1974). 
270 See id. at 227. 
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necessary. And the dissent flatly rejected the limitations that the claim-
specific approach to standing would impose on severability rulings. It 
relied on arguments that were, at bottom, arguments for a theory of 
supplemental standing that would always allow a severability ruling in the 
same case as a constitutional ruling. 
Thus, the entire Court has effectively invited the adoption of 
supplemental standing for severability. This Article suggests that the Court 
should be taken up on that invitation. But it also suggests that severability 
is not merely a special case, and that supplemental standing should apply in 
other contexts as well. Indeed, as NFIB reflects, the concept of 
supplemental standing should ultimately have appeal for both proponents 
and skeptics of current standing doctrine. That is because supplemental 
standing would draw on the bedrock principles that motivate standing 
doctrine in the first place. Yet it would also have the virtues of making the 
doctrine more flexible, enabling courts to decide important questions that 
they could not otherwise reach, and advancing democratic principles by 
placing more responsibility with Congress to decide which claims belong 
in federal court. 
